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The transformative use standard, which is an important aspect of
copyright law's fair use doctrine, has been confusing and uncertain since
1994 when it was first introduced by the United States Supreme Court in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.1 To try to make some sense of this
standard, this article extends the work of several scholars including Paul
Goldstein, Pamela Samuelson, Neil Netanel, and Michael Madison,2 who
have argued that the massive amount of fair use case law generally
divides itself into categories, patterns, or policy clusters which have their
own internal coherence. I contend that these observations apply as well
t Georgia Athletic Association Professor in Law, University of Georgia.
1. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433
(2008); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009);
Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1525 (2004); Neil Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715
(2011).
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to transformative use decisions more particularly, which similarly fit into
a number of recurring, distinct patterns.
The analytic difficulty presented by the transformative use standard
is that it is an ambiguous judicial construct3 layered on top of a pre-
existing ambiguous and often criticized legislative construct in the
Copyright Act.4 Section 107 codified the fair use doctrine with an
illustrative list of uses which might be fair followed by four general
factors to be examined when the fair use defense is raised by an alleged
infringer.' The determination of whether a particular use is
transformative has been added to this multi-factored analysis. The
challenge thus becomes relating this judicial construct to the statutory
factors in a meaningful way. Moreover, this standard's relationship to
other copyright law doctrines, such as the right to prepare derivative
works, needs to be explained.6 After all, a derivative work by definition
recasts, transforms, or adapts a preexisting work of authorship.
Examining the vast case law in this area suggests initially that judicial
results are largely, if not entirely, ad hoc and arbitrary.8 But lying
3. Transformative use has been described as an invasive species, and whether or not
a particular use is transformative is in the eye of the beholder. See CRAIG JOYCE,
MARSHALL LEAFFER, PETER JASZI, TYLER OCHOA & MICHAEL CARROLL, COPYRIGHT LAW
857, 866 n.4 (10th ed. 2016) [hereinafter CRAIG JOYCE ET AL.]. One scholar said
transformative use is "a triumph of mindless sound bite over principled analysis."
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 442. Another writes that the only clear lesson from the many
transformative use decisions is how bitterly disputed the test has proven to be in
application. See 4 MELViLLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05 [B] [6], at 13-224.14-224.15 (2017) [hereinafter NIMER ON COPYRIGHT].
4. See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIo STATE L.J. 47, 48 n.1
(2012) ("[T]he application of fair use is conventionally presumed to be uncertain. This
assumed incoherence and unpredictability has led many to question the value of fair
use."); David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 263, 287 (2003) ("[T]he factors ... are malleable" and "[In
the end, reliance on the four statutory factors to reach a fair use decision often seems
naught but a fairy tale."); Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
587, 596 (2008). Arguing that all of copyright, including fair use, is "a billowing white
goo." Id
5. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). The fair use privilege is a creation of the courts, having
been introduced in the United States in 1841 in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. D.
Mass. 1841). Congress codified it in the Copyright Act of 1976 in order "to restate the
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). See also CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at
820-21.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining 'derivative work').
It has been argued that to understand transformative use, it is necessary to appreciate how
derivative works differ from transformative works. Sag, supra note 4, at 55-56.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added to the definition of 'derivative work').
8. See, e.g., CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 857, 866 n.4 (describing the
evolution of transformative use jurisprudence as an invasive species that is taking over
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beneath the chaos, as other scholars contend, is a taxonomy that brings
some order.9
This effort to identify these underlying connections is not, however,
simply an effort to produce structure for the sake of structure. The
analytic struggle presented by copyright law is of fundamental
importance to our jurisprudence more generally because it illustrates the
continuing conflict between two competing constitutional doctrines--on
one hand, protecting intellectual property and ownership rights as an
incentive to create, and, on the other, protecting freedom of expression
including a creator's ability to build upon the works of others. The
purpose of copyright is "to encourage people to devote themselves to
intellectual and artistic creation"10 and the philosophy undergirding
copyright is the belief that "encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors."" At the same time, it has long been recognized that
few things are "strictly new and original throughout" and that every work
"in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and
use much which was well known, and used before."12 Hence, there is a
delicate balance and an inherent tension in copyright law between
protecting copyrighted materials and allowing others to build upon those
protected works,13 and it is important to understand how the
the garden, and that concluding whether a particular use is fair is like concluding that
something is pornographic-you know it when you see it); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 3, at § 15.05[BI[6], 13-23, 12-224.13 (stating that the only clear lesson is that
the transformative use test is bitterly disputed in its application); N. Boorstyn, THE
COPYRIGHT L. J. 29 (May-June 2014) (discussing whether or not a use is transformative
and fair is often in the eye of the beholder).
9. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 2, at 2537 (organizing fair use into patterns);
Madison, supra note 2, at 1623 (fair use decisions can be explained by whether the
challenged use falls within or outside accepted patterns); Goldstein, supra note 2, at 438
(stating that fair use cases tend to present themselves in recurring patterns).
10. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
11. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
12. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
13. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1994) (citing Carey v.
Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 170, 170 Eng. 'Rep. 679, 681 (K.B. 1803) (Lord Ellenborough)
("[W]hile I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-
right, one must not put manacles upon science.")). Cf Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders,
Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (D. Minn. 2003).
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one,
that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the
community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their
ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of
improvements, not the progress of the arts be rewarded.
Wall Data v. L.A. Cty. Sheriffs Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 480 n.33 (1984)); see also
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transformative use standard affects that balance. The question, in effect,
becomes when is the first author's work transformed fairly by a
subsequent author who makes a secondary use of that work?
This article first discusses fair use generally, including Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music and the evolution of the transformative use standard.
Next, it defines the transformative use standard and its relationship to the
right to prepare derivative works, and then discusses a dozen categories
and subcategories of well-established transformative and non-
transformative uses. This article's primary takeaways are that
transformative uses are presumptively fair in several of the established
categories and subcategories where the standard has proven to be useful
for purposes of careful analysis, but that copyright owners can
sometimes overcome this presumption and show infringement when the
defendant's taking of protected expression is substantial or when its
adaptation of the protected work is relatively trivial. In addition, this
article suggests that in situations where the defendant's unauthorized use
of the plaintiffs work clearly falls within one of the well-established fair
use activities listed in section 107's preamble-including news reporting,
criticism, research, scholarship, and teaching 14-the courts should not
feel compelled to explain why a challenged use is or is not
transformative. Instead of twisting and stretching the doctrine to fit, the
courts should stick with a traditional analysis and application of that use
in relation to the statute's four factors. The standard should not be
allowed to eviscerate the copyright owner's right to prepare derivative
works. Like the old productive/nonproductive use distinction discussed
by the Supreme Court in the venerable Sony/Betamax decision,"
analyzing whether a particular use is transformative should be helpful but
not the determinative consideration in assessing fair use.
I. FAIR USE FUNDAMENTALS AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE USE
STANDARD
Fair use is a long established limitation on copyright. 16 Codified in
section 107 of the Copyright Act,17 it recognizes a number of
Roger Zissu, Expanding Fair Use: The Trouble With Parody, the Case for Satire, 64 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 163, 165 (2017) (Brace Lecture).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
15. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
16. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345, 347-49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)
(discussing what is now called fair use for the first time in a United States decision); see
also Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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unauthorized uses of protected works that do not infringe.18 This
affirmative defense 9 enables courts to avoid literal application of the
exclusive rights and harsh results while simultaneously promoting the
creativity copyright is meant to encourage.20 It is a privilege to use
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the copyright
owner's permission,21 and an equitable rule of reason22 endorsed by
Congress in the 1976 Act. Fair use "allows the public to use not only
facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression
itself in certain circumstances." 23 There is no rigid, bright line approach
24to fair use. Each case has to be decided on its merits.
Section 107 lists several activities in its preamble that might be
regarded as fair use.25 These examples can be seen as productive uses of
copyrighted works that "build on the works of others by adding their own
socially valuable creative element." 2 6 The statute then identifies four
factors which the courts "shall" consider in determining whether a
particular use is fair: 1) the purpose and character of the use; 2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used; and 4) the effect of the use on the potential market for or
18. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976). A person who makes a fair use of a
protected work is not an infringer. See also Sony, 464 U.S. at 433. The list of exclusive
rights in section 106 is prefaced by the phrase "subject to sections 107 to 122." 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2012). Those sections set forth uses which are not infringements-which are
limitations on the exclusive rights-and the most general is section 107, the codification
of fair use. It allows certain uses notwithstanding the exclusive rights. Sony, 464 U.S. at
447.
19. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (noting that because
fair use is an affirmative defense, the proponent of the defense has the burden of
demonstrating fair use).
20. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, at § 13.05; CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note
3, at 820-21; H. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66; Iowa State Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad.
Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980). Fair use buttresses the goals of copyright by putting
works to beneficial use so that the public good coincides with claims of individuals. Wall
Data v. L.A. Cty. Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 43, at 267 (James Madison)).
21. Harper & Row Publrs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
22. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65; Sony, 464 U.S. at 475-76 n.27 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
23. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
24. There are no bright-line rules because the statute, and the doctrine it recognizes,
calls for a case-by-case analysis. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
65-66. Fair use analysis is a mixed question of law and fact, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
560, which may be resolved on summary judgment if a reasonable trier could reach only
one decision. See also Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Moral Majority Inc., 796 F.2d 1148,
1151 (9th Cir. 1986); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F. 2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
26. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 498 (6th ed. 2014)
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value of the copyrighted work.2 7 It is settled that no single factor is
determinative,28 and that the section's listed activities and factors are not
exhaustive. Congress did not assign weights to the factors nor did it
prescribe an order in which they are to be evaluated. The factors are for
balancing the equities, and the courts are free to adapt the doctrine to
particular situations case by case.29
A. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music
The Supreme Court has addressed the fair use privilege four times
since the doctrine was codified in the 1976 Act-Sony Corp. ofAmerica
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in 1984,30 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises in 1985,31 Stewart v. Abend in 1990,32 and
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. in 1994.33 Each decision is important
in its own right, but not until Campbell "did the Court finally confront
the doctrine of fair use . . . in a reasonably typical setting; parody." 34
Campbell concerned an unauthorized rap version of a 1964 song by
Roy Orbison and William Dees titled Oh, Pretty Woman. Luther
Campbell, of the group 2 Live Crew, sought permission to do a parody of
this classic song, and went ahead and recorded it after the copyright
owner, Acuff-Rose Music, denied the request.36 Campbell's version
copied the original work's characteristic opening bass riff and "repeated
it, but also produced otherwise distinctive sounds, interposing 'scraper'
noise, overla ing the music with solos in different keys, and altering the
drum beat."3 He also copied the opening line from Orbison's song but
then added his own words which "quickly degenerate[d] into a play on
words, substituting predictable lyrics with shocking ones., 3 8
27. 17 U.S.C.g§ 107(1)-(4) (2012).
28. Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984).
29. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65-66. See generally David Shipley, Conflicts
Between Copyright and the First Amendment After Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enterprises, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 983, 992-94 (1986); Zissu, supra note 13, at 166-67.
30. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (home recording of television broadcasts using new
technology).
31. 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (unauthorized publication of excerpts from an unpublished
manuscript).
32. 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (concerned primarily with ownership rights in a movie based
on a short story).
33. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
34. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 825.
35. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569.
36. Id. at 572-73.
37. Id. at 589.
38. Id. at 573 (quoting Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150,
1154-55 (M.D. Tenn. 1991)).
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The district court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew
concluding that the song was a fair use parody that borrowed no more
than necessary to conjure up the original, and that it was unlikely to
affect the market for the original. The Sixth Circuit reversed. It
assumed the 2 Live Crew version was a parody but explained that the
lower court did not put enough emphasis on the fact that commercial
uses are presumptively unfair and that harm to the market for the original
could be presumed as well.40 In addition, the court said that this parody
took too much protected expression from the original hit.41
The Supreme Court reversed following a very thorough analysis and
application of each of the factors codified in section 107.42 It held that
the Sixth Circuit erred in presuming this commercial use was unfair and
that market harm could be presumed as well.43 It also said that the Court
of Appeals erred in holding that 2 Live Crew had copied excessively
"considering the parodic purpose of the use."" In discussing the first fair
use factor--"the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purpose" 45 --the Court stated:
The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice
Story's words, whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the
objects' of the original creation, . . . or instead adds something
39. Id. (citing and quoting 754 F. Supp. at 1154-55, 1157-58)).
40. Id. (discussing Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1435, 1437-
39 (6th Cir. 1992)).
41. Id. at 573-74.
42. Id. at 572-94. The Court stated that a parody's commercial character is only one
of the elements to be assessed in a fair use analysis, and that the appellate court had given
insufficient consideration to the nature of parody in weighing the amount of copying. Id.
at 572, 584, 589-90.
43. Id. at 584-85. The Court stated that the
commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a work is only one element of
the first factor enquiry into its purpose and character. . . . Accordingly, the mere
fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a
finding of infringement, any more than the commercial character of a use.bars a
finding of fairness. If, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against
a finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the
illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107.
Id. at 584. The Court also explained that the lower court, in presuming a likelihood of
future harm to the plaintiff in Campbell and resolving the fourth statutory fair use factor
against the defendant, had erred just as it had with the first factor, by applying a
presumption about the effect of a commercial use. Id. at 590-91. The fourth statutory
factor is "the impact of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
44. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
2732018]
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new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other
words, whether and to what extent the new work is
'transformative.' . . . Although such transformative use is not
absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, . . . the goal of
copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered
by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at
the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space
within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors,
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use.4 6
The Supreme Court emphasized that the task of determining whether
a challenged use is fair:
[I]s not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like
the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis. . . .
Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one
from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed
together, in light of the purposes of copyright.4 7
There is, of course, more to the Supreme Court's Campbell decision
than its elevation of transformative use to special status in fair use
analysis.48 For example, the Court aligned itself with all the other "courts
that have held that parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim
fair use under § 107 ."49 It also acknowledged that, for the purposes of
copyright law, "the heart of any parodist's claim to quote from existing
material, is the use of some elements of a prior author's composition to
create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author's work." 0
In contrast, the claim to unfairness diminishes considerably when the
alleged infringer's taking from another work has "no critical bearing on
46. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 577-78 (citing Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L.
REv. 1105, 1110-11 (1990)).
48. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 857.
49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. The Court acknowledged that it first considered
whether parody could be a fair use in Benny v. Loew's, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956),
aff'd sub nom Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), but did not
issue an opinion.
50. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
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the substance or style" of that work." The Court agreed with those courts
that said, "[p]arody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so
has some claim to use the creation of its victim's . . . imagination,
whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification
for the very act of borrowing." 5 2 These statements, however, should not
be interpreted to mean that satire cannot be a fair use.5
B. Transformative Use Before and After Campbell
The transformative use standard announced in Campbell can be
traced to the writings of the Honorable Pierre Leval, in particular his
1990 article, Toward a Fair Use Standard.54 He wrote that a use is
transformative if it is productive and employs the quoted material in a
different manner or for a different purpose from the original, thus adding
value to the original-"if the quoted matter is used as raw material,
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new
insights and understandings-this is the very type of activity that the fair
use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.'s
This standard is in debt to the 'productive use' concept that had been
embraced by lower courts prior to the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios. 5 In Sony, the Court
noted that fair use analysis requires a sensitive balancing of interests and
that:
[t]he distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' uses
may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be wholly
determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly
endeavor certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying
51. Id. ("If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing on the ...
original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid
the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing ...
another's work diminishes accordingly. . .
52. Id. at 580-81.
53. David Shipley, A Dangerous Undertaking Indeed: Juvenile Humor, Raunchy
Jokes, Obscene Materials and Bad Taste in Copyright, 98 KENTUCKY L.J. 517, 550
(2009-10). In a footnote, the Court recognized that there could be situations where
"taking parodic aim at an original is a less critical factor in the analysis, and looser forms
of parody may be found to be fair use, as may satire with lesser justification for the
borrowing than would otherwise be required." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81 n.14.
54. Leval, supra note 47, at 1105 (1990).
55. Id. at 1111.
56. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(holding that private, noncommercial taping of television shows for the purpose of time
shifting was a fair use).
2018] 275
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to avoid interrupting a poker game, the question is not simply
two dimensional. For one thing, it is not true that all copyrights
are fungible. Some copyrights govern material with broad
potential secondary markets. Such material may well have a
broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for
commercial harm. Copying a news broadcast may have a
stronger claim to fair use than copying a motion picture. And, of
course, not all uses are fungible. Copying for commercial gain
has a much weaker claim to fair use than copying for personal
enrichment. But the notion of social 'productivity' cannot be a
complete answer to this analysis. A teacher who copies to
prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher
who copies for the sake of broadening his personal
understanding of his specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the
sake of broadening her understanding of what her constituents
are watching; or a constituent who copies a news program to
help make a decision on how to vote.57
In making this statement about the usefulness of the
productive/nonproductive use distinction, the Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit which had rejected fair use; the Court of Appeals had
concluded that private, noncommercial taping of television shows for
time shifting purposes was not a productive use and therefore, was, not
fair.5 8 In short, the Supreme Court made clear that a nonproductive use
could be fair use.
Notwithstanding this warning that the productive/nonproductive use
distinction cannot be wholly determinative in any sensitive fair use
balance, 9 as well as the Court's statements in Campbell about evaluating
each of the four factors and rejecting presumptions, the transformative
use standard is now at the core of the fair use doctrine. 60 It has taken on a
life of its own.61 The determination of whether a particular use is
57. Id. at 455 n.40
58. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 977 (9th Cir.
1981)
59. Professor Leaffer states that the productive use theory was specifically rejected in
Sony. LEAFFER, supra note 26, at 500.
60. Sag, supra note 4, at 55. But see, Jennifer Rothman, Best Intentions:
Reconsidering Best Practices Statements in the Context of Fair Use and Copyright Law,
57 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 371, 377 (2010) (finding that transformativeness is
important, but it is not determinative and should not be regarded as the most important
fair use factor).
61. Laura Heymann, Everything is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response,
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 447 (2008) ("[T]he term has since become as fundamental a
part of any fair use analysis as the statutory language itself.").
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transformative-subsumed within the inquiry into the first factor,62 has
turned into a presumption; if a use is deemed transformative, fair use
follows almost automatically; but if the use is deemed not
transformative, then it likely will not be considered fair.63 Some courts
have failed to remember that certain uses of protected works that are not
transformative, like copying for classroom use or research purposes,
have long been recognized as fair, 4 and that some transformative uses
should be held to infringe after the required sensitive balancing of the
fair use provision's four factors. 6 5 The Supreme Court might not have
intended to give this standard presumption-like status, but it did state that
"the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance
of other factors, like commercialism, that may weight against a finding
of fair use." 66 In any event, it reduces the importance of the other
factors67 and drives fair use analysis.68
The problem for courts, practitioners, and commentators is that
transformativeness cannot be defined with precision,69 and that the lower
62. Jonathan Francis, On Appropriation: Cariou v. Prince and Measuring Contextual
Transformation in Fair Use, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 681, 682 (2014).
63. The fair use defense has been discussed in over 140 reported decisions since
Campbell was decided in 1994, and the issue of whether the defendant's challenged use
was transformative is discussed in most of these decisions. In the overwhelming majority
of cases in which the court concluded that the defendant's use was transformative, it
found fair use. On the other hand, in the overwhelming majority of the decisions in which
the court determined that the use was not transformative, it ruled against fair use. It is rare
to find a decision in which a court said that the use was not transformative but still found
fair use. See also Netanal, supra note 2, at 768-69.
64. The preamble to section 107 lists "teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Copying works for
these purposes is not transformative. Fair use is not limited to transformative or
productive uses. LEAFFER, supra note 26, at 499-500; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (stating that a transformative use is not necessary for a
finding of fair use).
65. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, at §§ 13.05[A][1][b], 13-169-171 (2017).
66. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
67. Sag, supra note 4, at 55. Transformative has become a short hand for fair or not
fair. See also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, at § 13.05[A][1][b], 13-169-171. But
see, Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of US. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008) (concluding that the market factor is most important in
predicting whether a use is fair based on the finding that 83.8% of the time the evaluation
of market harm correlates with the outcome).
68. Netanel, supra note 2, at 734.
69. "The plethora of cases addressing this topic means there is no shortage of
language from other courts elucidating (or obfuscating) the meaning of transformation."
Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F. 3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Sag, supra note
4, at 57. A leading casebook asks, "[h]ow would you advise a publisher that wanted to
ride the commercial wave of a new hit TV show with an unauthorized 'companion'
volume that draws heavily on that show?" CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 866 n.4.
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courts have muddied the waters by taking the concept well beyond the
commercial parody at issue in Campbell.70 They have often applied
transformativeness in a conclusory manner.7 ' This highly contentious
topic 7 2 has been the subject of many articles, 73 and has been described as
an invasive species like kudzu that is taking over the garden.74 One
scholar said it is "a triumph of mindless sound bite over principled
analysis.""s Another states that "the only clear lesson to emerge [from the
many decisions] is how bitterly disputed the transformative use test has
proven to be in application." 7 6 Like the canons or rules of statutory
interpretation, there are plenty of reported decisions to use on either side
of most transformative use issues.7 You know it when you see it!7 1 In
other words, whether or not a use is transformative often seems to be in
the eye of the beholder.7 9
Even though fair use decisions may appear ad hoc, even though
difficult judgment calls must be made in assessing alterations to a work,
and even though it is confusing and uncertain to determine whether the
purpose and character of a particular unauthorized use is
This note references decisions about unauthorized lexicons and compendiums that
seemed transformative but were held not to be fair uses. Id.
70. Sag, supra note 4, at 56.
71. NIMMERON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, at § 13.05[A][1][b] at 13-168-169.
72. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013).
73. See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 61; Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433 (2008); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change
the Less They Seem "Transformed": Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y U.S.A. 251 (1998); John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use,
Free Speech and an Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1201 (2005);
Mary W.S. Wong, Transformative User-Generated Content in Copyright Law: Infringing
Derivative Works or Fair Use? 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075 (2009); Matthew Sag,
Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012); R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness
and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2008);
74. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 857.
75. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 442.
76. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, at § 15.05[B][6], 13-224.15. "[W]hether a
work is transformative is a often highly contentious topic." Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.,
725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int'l, 292 F.3d 512,
517-19 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing that Judge Posner critiqued the transformative use
concept as well as the four factor test. He drew a distinction between complementary uses
of a work, such as a book review or parody that are fair, and unfair substitutional uses
that usurp the market for the work or derivatives and infringe).
77. In regard to the tools of statutory construction, the late Professor Karl Llewellyn
wrote in 1950 that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point." Karl
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401 (1950).
78. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("But I
know it when I see it.").
79. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 866 n.4.
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transformative,80 advice has to be given, briefs have to be written,
arguments have to be made, and judges have to make decisions.
Stanford's Paul Goldstein made the following three observations about
fair use: first, it is a "pragmatic, fact specific doctrine that proceeds from
case to case" with experience as its guide; second, fair use cases tend to
"present themselves in recurring categories"; and third, each of these
categories has "its own equities and efficiencies that courts attend to" in
trying to resolve particular cases.81 His second observation about fair use,
that cases tend to present themselves in recurring categories, is
reinforced by other scholars including Berkeley's Pamela Samuelson,
82
who organized fair use cases into patterns or policy relevant clusters,
and Pittsburgh's Michael Madison, who asserts that fair use decisions
can be explained by whether the challenged use falls within or outside
accepted patterns.8 ' These observations about patterns, categories and
policy clusters are the foundation for this article's attempt to categorize
transformative use decisions. The transformative use case law fits into a
number of recurring patterns. Still, the lines are not clear and this author
would much prefer to write an appellate brief on whether or not a
particular use is transformative, instead of writing an opinion letter to a
client on whether his or her prospective use of another's copyrighted
work would likely be transformative and, therefore, fair.
II. DEFINING TRANSFORMATIVE USES
Many courts have attempted to explain what makes a use
transformative." For example, "[t]here must be real, substantial
condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment
bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of scissors; or extracts of
the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work."8 1
Some quote Judge Leval's influential article which states that if
[t]he secondary use adds value to the original - if the quoted
matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of
80. Boorstyn, supra note 8, at 29.
81. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 438.
82. Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Use, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2537 (2009).
83. Michael Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1525, 1623 (2004).
84. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc. 725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013) (saying that there
are a plethora of cases elucidating and obfuscating the meaning of transformativeness).
85. Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110,
1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C. D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4,901)).
2018] 279
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings-this is the very type of activity that the fair use
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.86
Campbell is important too with courts repeating the Supreme Court's
admonition that it is necessary to ask if the challenged use supersedes the
objects of the original or "adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character." 87
According to some courts, adding value does not necessarily require
actual modification of the original work. "The use of a copyrighted work
need not alter or augment the work to be transformative in nature.
Rather, it can be transformative in function or purpose without altering or
actually adding to the original work."8 8 The flip side of this is the
proposition that "where the use is for the same intrinsic purpose as [the
copyright holder's] . . . such use seriously weakens a claimed fair use."89
Thus, doing no more than finding a new way to exploit the creative
virtues of the original work is not transformative. 90
Stating these several verbal formulations is relatively easy, but
applying them and explaining why a particular use is, or is not,
transformative is challenging. The explanations given in some decisions
do a better job of obfuscating than elucidating. 91 Moreover, it has been
argued that to understand transformative use, one has to appreciate how
derivative works differ from transformative works.92 This is a subtle
distinction that is also easier to state than to apply and explain in actual
disputes. This difficulty is caused by "the word 'transform' also
play[ing] a role in defining 'derivative works,' over which the original
rights holder retains exclusive control."
The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as one "based upon one
or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, . . . or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted." 94 One of the exclusive rights held by the
86. Seltzer 725 F. 3d at 1176 (quoting Leval, supra note 54, at 1111); Castle Rock
Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Leval, supra note 54, at 1111).
87. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
88. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC., 562 F.3d 630, 639 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007)).
89. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117 (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
90.. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006).
91. Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1176.
92. Sag, supra note 4, at 55-56.
93. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2015).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
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copyright owner is the right "to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work."9' The paradigmatic examples of derivative works
include translating a novel into another language, adapting a novel as a
play or a motion picture, and recasting a novel as an audiobook. 96
The contention is that derivative work transformations are not
necessarily transformative as that term was intended by the Supreme
Court in the fair use context. This is because the change, such as
converting a novel into a play, does "not involve the kind of
transformative purpose that favors a fair use finding." 9 7 "Although
derivative works that are subject to the author's copyright transform an
original work into a new mode of presentation, such works -- unlike
works of fair use-take expression for purposes that are not
'transformative."' 98
[The statute] suggests that derivative works generally involve
transformations in the nature of changes of form. . . . By
contrast, copying from an original for the purpose of criticism or
commentary on the original, or provision of information about it,
tends most clearly to satisfy Campbell's notion of the
'transformative' purpose involved in the analysis of Factor
One.99
Another way to say this is
that virtually all works that qualify as transformative are
derivative works; but not all derivative works are transformative.
A new work that copies from another, and adds something new,
fails to meet the further different purpose requirement for
transformative when it is derivative but "supersede[s] the objects
of the original creation.o
We know that a transformative work under fair use analysis "imbues
the original with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning or message." 101 However, it is said that
95. Id. at § 106(2).
96. Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014).
97. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 215; Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Boarders, Inc., 291 F.
Supp. 2d 980, 990 n.5 (D. Minn. 2003); see also Zissu, supra note 13, at 175.
98. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998).
99. Authors Guild v. Google, 804 F.3d at 215-16.
100. Zissu, supra note 13, at 175 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S.
569, 569 (1994)).
101. Sag, supra note 4, at 55-56 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
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assessing transformativeness is not a question of degree but a "judgment
of the motivation and meaning of those differences."1 02 Retelling Gone
With the Wind from the perspective of the mixed race, slave half sister of
Scarlett O'Hara would thus be seen as a transformative parody and fair
use,103 while a more traditional sequel based on Margaret Mitchell's
classic novel and using some of the primary characters would be an
infringing derivative work if done without permission. 104 The former is
for the transformative purpose of parody, while the latter, the sequel,
serves the same purpose as the original novel.10
In my opinion, it is difficult to make a judgment about the motivation
of authors, their purposes, and the meaning of differences between a
secondary work (the adaptation) and the original work that it uses. The
movie musical, My Fair Lady is adapted from the Broadway version of
that musical comedy of the same name with music and lyrics by Lerner
and Loewe. The Broadway musical is an adaptation of George Bernard
Shaw's stage play 'Pygmalion.' 10 6 Do the movie and Broadway musical
have the same purpose as the underlying play?
Luther Campbell of 2 Live Crew unsuccessfully sought permission
to record his parody-rap adaptation of 'Oh, Pretty Woman' before
releasing it.107 He knew that his parody was an adaptation of that popular
song. How can one say that a parody version of a hit song is any more or
less transformative of the underlying work than a play subsequently
recast as a musical and later as a movie? Is 2 Live Crew's parody
version-their comment on the original song-more clearly a distinct or
different purpose from the original Roy Orbison rendition than was the
Lerner and Lowe recasting of Pygmalion as the musical My Fair Lady?
102. Id. at 56.
103. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282 (1lth Cir.
2001) (the Mitchell estate would not permit a sequel to Gone With the Wind to include
anything on miscegenation or homosexuality, and the defendant's unauthorized book
featured both).
104. In support of his hypothetical about Pride and Prejudice and Zombies being a
parody of Jane Austen's original classic, Professor Sag cites the litigation over the Wind
Done Gone in SunTrust Bank v. Houghon Mifflin, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). See
Sag, supra note 4, at 56.
105. One court suggested that a book with a collection of unauthorized photographs of
Beanie Babies would be treated as an infringing derivative work since it transforms,
recasts or adapts the dolls, but the use of unauthorized photographs of the dolls in a
collector's guide that provides tips to doll collectors would not be derivative since it does
not recast the dolls. Instead, it is informational. It serves a different purpose, and would
be treated as a fair use. Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 980,
990-91 (D. Minn. 2003) (discussing Ty Inc. v. Publ'ns. Int'l, 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir.
2002)).
106. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 220-21.
107. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1994).
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In the words of Campbell, both adaptations seem to "imbue the original
with a further purpose or different character," and alter it "with new
expression."108
The risk with this subtle distinction between transformative uses and
derivative works is that misapplication of the transformative use standard
can undermine the copyright owner's right to prepare derivative
works.10 9 Perhaps the safest conclusion is that a derivative work
transforms a preexisting work, but this transformation is not necessarily
transformative for fair use purposes.110 Adding to this subtle distinction
is that courts have said, as noted above, that a secondary use can be
transformative and fair even if the original work is not modified so long
as the purpose of the secondary use is different from the intrinsic purpose
of the original use; ie., it presents a different message such as
commenting on the original or providing otherwise unavailable
information about the original work. As Judge Leval explained recently,
[t]he word 'transformative' cannot be taken too literally as a
sufficient key to understanding the elements of fair use. It is
rather a suggestive symbol for a complex thought, and does not
mean that any and all changes made to an author's original text
will necessarily support a finding of fair use.11 1
So how does counsel proceed to offer guidance to his or her client
about moving forward with a creative project or bringing an infringement
action in view of these subtle distinctions and the nuances in language
108. Id. at 579. Another way to think about this transformative use/derivative work
distinction is to consider Romeo and Juliet and West Side Story. If Shakespeare's
copyright was still in effect in the late 1950s when West Side Story became a hit on
Broadway and then on film, would the Bard of Avon have had a viable infringement
claim against Leonard Bernstein and his collaborators if they had done West Side Story
without permission? Could Bernstein's recasting of that tragic love story be defended as
transformative and therefore a fair use? West Side Story is a musical transformation of
Romeo and Juliet that fits comfortably within the Copyright Act's definition of derivative
work, and it also imbues the original with a different character and alters it with new
expression that fits within the Court's explanation of a transformative use. Is the purpose
of the musical the same as the purpose of the play?
109. LEAFFER, supra note 26, at 499. Cf Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 291
F. Supp. 2d 980, 991-92 (D. Minn. 2003) (discussing how defendant's use of plaintiff's
copyright stickers could be considered an unauthorized derivative work in response to
defendant's argument that their use was transformative).
110. Boorstyn, supra note 8, at 28. This author notes that an unauthorized movie based
on a novel is transformative in that it adds something new, gives the work new
expression, and offers a new aesthetic, but that the movie would not be. treated as a
transformative, fair use, but as an infringing, derivative work. Id.
111. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214-15 (2d Cir. 2015).
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used by the courts? For many lawyers, it is helpful to study prior
decisions carefully and decide whether a client's project or problem is
analogous or how it might be distinguished. The following sections
organize many of the post-Campbell decisions as a transformative use
taxonomy in order to help in assessing whether a proposed project or an
unauthorized use might be a fair use.
A. Parodyll2
There have been many fair use decisions involving parody since the
Campbell decision in 1994 in which the Court stated that "parody has an
obvious claim to transformative value."'13 In a substantial majority of
these cases the uses were deemed transformative and fair, at least where
the parodic character of the defendant's use could reasonably be
perceived.1 14
For example, Mattel's iconic fashion doll Barbie has been the subject
of many parodies; she has not been reluctant to litigate, and she has often
lost due to a solid fair use defense."' The comedian Carol Burnett had
her "Charwoman" character parodied in an episode of the Family Guy
and sued unsuccessfully for infringement." Another episode of the
Family Guy resulted in litigation after the song "When You Wish Upon a
Star" was evoked in a song parody titled "When You Wish upon a
Weinstein." This was held to be transformative and fair."' The highly-
112. This is one of the two categories mentioned by Professor Goldstein. Goldstein,
supra note 2, at 440. Professor Samuelson places parody cases in a category where First
Amendment interests of subsequent authors and the public are implicated. Samuelson,
supra note 82, at 2549-51.
113. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
114. Id. at 582.
115. See, e.g, Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that
defendant's adaptation of SuperStar Barbie to become Dungeon Doll-a dominatrix
Barbie-was transformative and fair use); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353
F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a series of 78 photos of Barbie in various positions,
nude, and juxtaposed with kitchen appliances, were parody and fair use); cf Mattel, Inc.
v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the song titled Barbie Girl
which poked fun at Barbie and the values she represents was to be a permitted trademark
parody).
116. Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal.
2007) (holding that the animated figure resembling plaintiffs Charwoman character with
a role in a skit titled 'Peterotica' was a parody and fair use).
117. Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (holding that the parody of this song from Disney's Pinocchio, aimed at Disney's
antisemitism, was fair use); see also Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 320
F. Supp. 2d 84 (S.D.N.Y 2003) (holding that the altered use of the first three lines from
the song Wonderful Life in hip hop artist Ghostface Killah's song The Forest was a
parody, transformative and fair use).
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regarded photographer Annie Leibovitz sued unsuccessfully for
infringement against a poster for the movie 'Naked Gun 33-1/3' that
superimposed the head of the late Leslie Nielsen on a photo of a pregnant
model posed to look like Leibovitz's portrait of a nude, pregnant Demi
Moore that had appeared on the cover of Vanity Fair. This was held to be
transformative and fair. 18
In these cases the defendants were successful in convincing the
courts that their uses of the works were parodies and fair use-that the
allegedly infringing work used some element of the plaintiffs
"composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comment[ed] on"
the plaintiffs work.1' 9 On the other hand, if the defendant's use of
another's protected work is not seen as commenting on or criticizing that
work, then the defendant's fair use defense becomes much weaker
because it does not qualify as a parody.1 20 It will not have obvious
transformative value. As Justice Kennedy cautioned in his concurring
opinion in Campbell, courts applying "our fair use analysis ... must take
118. Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1998); see also
Louis Vuitton Malletier, SA v. My Other Bag, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 425 (2d Cir. 2016)
(holding that defendant's use of Vuitton's designs produced a new expression and
message that was transformative).
119. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994); see also Brownmark
Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012) (imitating South Park
series of a video that had gone viral held to be fair use and parody); Lyons Partnership v.
Ginnoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (using a purple dinosaur, ridiculing
Barney, in a comedy routine at sports events held to be transformative and fair use);
Master Card Int'l v. Nader 2000 Primary, 70 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (using a
campaign ad for Nader's campaign, mimicking MasterCard's Priceless ads, held to be
transformative and fair use); Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. Haute Diggity Dog, 464 F.
Supp. 2d 495 (E.D. Va. 2006) (stating that defendant's Chewy Vuitton dog toy held to be
transformative and fair use in their parody of the high end status of plaintiff's products);
Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (using fifteen
seconds from Beatles' song Imagine in documentary film EXPELLED, No Intelligence
Allowed to criticize the naivete of John Lennon's views held to be transformative and fair
use); Lucasfilm v. Media Market Group, 182 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating
that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on an infringement claim against animated
pornographic film Starballz that draws on Star Wars because of its parodic character);
CCA & B, LLC v. F + W Media Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1321-22 (N.D. Ga. 2011)
(holding defendant's Elf Off book makes transformative use of plaintiffs elf doll and is a
parody); Admji v. DLT Entm't Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding
defendant's play 3C is a highly transformative parody of the 1970s comedy series
Three's Company). Cf AFLAC v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(holding an unsuccessful trademark claim against gubernatorial candidate's use of the
AFLAC duck in campaign ads with his opponent's head superimposed on the duck and
repeatedly quacking "TaftQuack").
120. Shipley, supra note 53, at 558-59.
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care to ensure that not just any commercial takeoff is rationalized post
hoc as a parody."1 2 1
For example, in Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books US.A.,
Inc., the defendants' retelling of the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial in
a book written and illustrated to evoke a Dr. Seuss book, with both
illustrations and writing done in those distinctive styles, was not treated
as a parody but as an infringing satire. 122 The book "simply retell[s] the
Simpson tale," with "no effort to create a transformative work."1 23
Similarly, the defendants in Columbia Pictures Industries v. Miramax
Films Corp. asserted that their trailer and movie posters for Michael
Moore's satiric documentary, The Big One, were fair use parodies of the
hit film Men in Black and posters for that movie. 124 The court disagreed:
The TBO Poster and Trailer do not create a "transformative
work." The TBO advertisements cannot reasonably be perceived
as commenting on or criticizing the ads for "Men In Black." The
TBO Poster merely incorporates several elements of the MIB
Poster: figures with a particular stance carrying large weapons,
standing in front of the New York skyline at night, with a similar
layout. Similarly, the TBO Trailer appears to be little more than
an effort to "get attention" for "The Big One" and "avoid the
drudgery in working up something fresh."
Rather than commenting on or criticizing Plaintiffs' ads,
Defendants' ads seek to use Plaintiffs' ads as a vehicle to entice
viewers to see "The Big One" in the same manner as Plaintiffs
used their own ads to entice viewers to see "Men In Black." In
121. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 600 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
122. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D.
Cal. 1996), aff'd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
123. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th
Cir. 1997). Similarly, the lower court stated that the defendants made no "attempt to
comment upon the text or themes of The Cat in the Hat." 924 F. Supp. at 1569. But see
Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enters., 16 Civ. 9974 (AKH), 2017 WL 1378413 (S.D.N.Y. Sep.
19, 2017) (holding that Who's Holiday!, a one-woman play about a grown-up Cindy Lou
is a parody that does not infringe How the Grinch Stole Christmas); Mindy Pava, Kelley
Drye & Warren, Joy in Who-Ville? Playwright Wins Fair Use Copyright Dispute in
Parody "Grinch, " AIPLA NEwsSTAND, Sept. 19, 2017; James Burger, Thompson
Coburn, The Grinch Loses and Protection ofParody Wins, AIPLA NEwsSTAND, Sept. 21,
2017.
124. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Miramax Film, Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187-88
(C.D. Cal. 1998).
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such circumstances, Defendants have not created a
transformative work which alters the original with new
expression, meaning or message. 12 5
The major problem with the post-Campbell parody case law is the
lack of guidance on how to determine whether a challenged spoof or
take-off criticizes or comments on the original work in order to qualify as
a parody.126 The line between a transformative parody and a satire is not
clear. Judge Posner writes that fair use defense should apply only if the
parody targets the parodied work instead of using it as a resource to
create a comic effect, but he acknowledges problems "both in
distinguishing these uses and of overlaps between them." 12 7 A pastiche
that transforms two or more popular works can be very entertaining, but
is it really a parody that comments on one or more of the protected works
that it utilizes in the mash-up?1 28 Still, unauthorized uses which are
clearly parodies will likely be held to be transformative and fair.
125. Id. at 1188 (citations omitted).
126. Shipley, supra note 53, at 559. See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding novel retelling the story of Gone With the Wind
from the perspective of a mixed race, half-sister of Scarlett O'Hara to be a parody);
Northland Family Planning Clinic v. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962
(C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding use of portions of plaintiff's video aimed at de-stigmatizing
abortion in a video attacking abortion and plaintiff's clinics to be a parody). But see,
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding defendant's reproduction of
plaintiff's photograph as a sculptural work was held not to be a parody, but an infringing
work); Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding that
defendant's novel, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, marketed as sequel to
Catcher in the Rye, was not parody or satire and unlikely defendant could show it
transformed Salinger's novel) vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010)
(improper to presume irreparable harm after finding likelihood of success on the merits);
Henley v. Devore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding online campaign
videos with songs similar to plaintiffs songs were not transformative fair use parodies of
those songs); TCA TV Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F3d 168 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding use
without alteration of the Who's on First comedy routine in a play with a dark critique of
small town norms was not transformative and fair).
127. Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 71 (1992);
see also Samuelson, supra note 2, at 2553-53 (classifying the Wind Done Gone use of
Gone With the Wind as a transformative critique). Some cases are, however, easy. See,
e.g., Broadcast Music v. McDade & Sons, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Ariz. 2013) (stating
performance of Sweet Home Alabama with Arizona substituted for Alabama was not a
parody).
128. Anandashankar Mazumdar, Dispute Over Dr. Seuss-Star Trek Mashup Heading
for Trial, BNA: NEWS (June 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/dispute-dr-seussstar-
n73014453206 (stating that Dr. Seuss argued unsuccessfully that mashups should not be
protected with the court saying that it needed more evidence before deciding how fair use
factors balanced out).
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B. Other Forms of Commentary and Criticism
Section 107's preamble does not mention parody, but it does state
that "the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as
criticism, comment, . . . is not an infringement of copyright."1 2 9 Courts
have had little difficulty concluding that many different uses of protected
works for criticism and comment are fair,130 but sometimes require an
alleged infringer to show that the challenged use was transformative. 13 1
In my opinion, this is at odds with the Court's statement in Campbell that
a use need not be transformative in order to be a fair;1 32 it ignores the
well-established principle that when a challenged use falls within one of
the purposes listed in section 107's preamble then the first fair use factor
ordinarily favors the defendant, 1 33 and it overworks the word
transformative.1 34
The use of a video to criticize the plaintiff was transformative and a
fair use in Caner v. Autry.135 Plaintiff Ergun Caner was an author and
evangelical speaker who had been dismissed as dean of Liberty
University's seminary following an investigation into his claims of being
raised in Turkey and indoctrinated with extreme Islamic philosophy.1 36
The defendant posted two videos on YouTube with recordings of Caner
speaking about Islam interspersed with criticism and commentary in an
effort to refute the plaintiffs claims about his past.1 37 Caner's
infringement suit was dismissed on summary judgment with the court
holding that the defendant's edited videos were transformative.' 3 8 The
court stated that "it has long been established that fair use protects the
transformative use of a work to criticize, even when the parody or
129. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (West 2012).
130. A use more likely qualifies as fair if a work is used for the purpose of criticism or
comment, two of the enumerated fair use exceptions in section 107. Bouchat v. Baltimore
Ravens Ltd. P'ship, 619 F.3d 301, 307-08 (4th Cir. 2010).
131. Id. at 308-09.
132. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
133. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that if the
work falls within one of the favored purposes there is a strong presumption that the first
factor favors the defendant).
134. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 2556 (discussing a category of cases she classifies as
critical commentary).
135. Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689 (W.D. Va. 2014).
136. Id. at 692-93.
137. Id. at 692.
138. Id. at 715.
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criticism is so forceful that it may eliminate the market for the object of
the criticism."l39
It would have been sufficient to say that the defendant's use of
plaintiffs protected expression was to criticize the substance of his
claims. After all, the defendant's criticism of the plaintiff was "at the
heart of what fair use seeks to protect, in that it targets the allegedly
inconsistent statements of a person who has placed himself in the public
spotlight through the very narratives now under fire."1 40 There are
several other decisions with similar results.14 1
Even though criticism and comment are in the preamble to section
107, other post-Campbell decisions have analyzed unauthorized uses that
were obvious forms of criticism or comment to determine whether they
were parodies. The plaintiff in Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v.
Center for Bio-Ethical Reform1 4 2 created a video to be used for outreach,
counseling, and education in an effort to de-stigmatize abortion, to point
out that abortion is not uncommon, and to emphasize that women are
good regardless of how they exercise their reproductive rights. 143 The
video was titled "Every Day, Good Women Choose Abortion." 44 The
defendant used portions of this video verbatim in its own anti-abortion
139. Id. at 714. The dispute started with Caner submitting a take-down notice. Youtube
then informed Caner that defendant Autry had disputed the take down so YouTube would
repost the videos unless Caner sued within 10 days. Id.at 693.
140. Id at710-11.
141. See Belmore v. City Pages, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673 (D. Minn. 1995) (stating
republication of entire news article as a critique of a police officer and police department
was transformative and fair use); see'also Ascend Health Corp. v. Wells, No. 4:12-CV-
00083-BR, 2013 WL 1010589 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2013) (holding defendant's use of
images from the plaintiffs website on his blogs and social media to criticize the
plaintiff's business practices was transformative and a fair use); Katz v. Chevaldina, No.
12-2221 1-CV, 2014 WL 4385690 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2014), affd Katz v. Google, Inc.,
802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding defendant blogger's use of plaintiffs
unflattering copyrighted picture of himself on blog postings criticizing plaintiffs
business and litigation practices was transformative because in some posts the defendant
had cropped the photo, pasted images into cartoons with derogatory captions, and it was
used for a purpose different from its original purpose); Hoge v. Schmalfeldt, No. ELH-
14-1683, 2014 WL 3052489 (D. Md. July 1 2014) (finding defendant's use of plaintiffs
blog posts in order to respond to material found in those blogs transformative and for the
purpose of criticism or comment); City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, No. CV-15-01815-
MWF, 2015 WL 5025839 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20 2015) (stating defendant's use of portions
of city's copyrighted video recordings of council meetings to make videos critical of the
council and elected officials was transformative and fair use).
142. Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F.
Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
143. Id at 966.
144. Id. at 966. The plaintiff operates family planning clinics in the Detroit area. Id.
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videos. 145 The narrative from the plaintiffs video continued to be heard
while one of defendant's videos showed graphic images of abortion
procedures and ended "with [the plaintiffs] name, telephone number,
and the words 'Your Dead baby at 10 to 12 weeks,' superimposed over
[an aborted] fetus." 14 6 The court discussed at length the parties'
arguments about whether the defendant's videos were parodies, 147 and
ultimately concluded that they were. 14 8 Although parodies need not be
humorous, 149 the characterization of the defendant's videos as parodies
was not necessary because it was obvious that they were aimed at
criticizing the message in plaintiffs video and were transformative. The
court stated that "[t]he new background soundtrack, the visuals, and the
juxtaposition of the new video clips with the original creates an entirely
different impact on the viewer. Thus, the accused Videos are
transformative."1 o The court granted summary judgment for the
defendants holding that their use of the plaintiffs video was insulated as
a fair use.151
Instead of stretching the transformative use concept to cover the
reproduction of a protected work in connection with what is clearly
comment or criticism it would be preferable for the court to play it
straight, as in Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations.15 2
Savage, a conservative talk show host, sued the defendant for posting
copies of his anti-Islamic statements on its website along with a four
145. Id. at 967.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 970-78 ("In this case, the TAG and CBR Videos are parodies of the
Northland Video because they use segments of the Northland Video in alternation with
macabre images of abortion procedures to deride the original work's message that
abortion is 'normal' and that good women choose to terminate their pregnancy." Id. at
972).
148. Id. at 976.
149. See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a novel retelling the story of Gone With the Wind from the perspective of a
mixed race half-sister of Scarlett O'Hara was a parody).
150. Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F.
Supp. 2d 962, 978 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
151. Id at 966. Cf BWP Media USA v. Gossip Cop Media, LLC, 87 F. Supp. 2d 499
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (suit against celebrity gossip website for reproducing several photos and
a video dismissed as to some images and not others due in part to difficulty of
determining the purpose of the copying and whether it was transformative). Susan
Decker, White Supremacists' Use of Pepe the Frog Fought by Its Creator, BNA IP L.
REs. CENTER (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-
18/white-supremacists-use-of-pepe-the-frog-fought-by-its-creator (discussing whether
use of copyrighted character on 'alt-right' sites is fair use).
152. Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., No. C 07-6076 SI, 2008 WL
2951281 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008).
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minute recording from one of his shows."5 The defendant posted these
materials to criticize Savage's views, organize a boycott, and raise
money.1 54 The court said that there was "no dispute that the purpose and
character of defendant's use . . . was a form of public criticism.""' In
concluding that the first fair use factor favored the defendant the court
stated:
To comment on plaintiffs statements without reference or
citation to them would not only render defendants' criticism less
reliable, but be unfair to plaintiff. Further, it was not
unreasonable for defendants to provide the actual audio excerpts,
since they reaffirmed the authenticity of the criticized statements
and provided the audience with the tone and manner in which
plaintiff made the statements.156
An analogous pre-Campbell decision which found fair use in the
context of criticism and comment without turning to transformativeness
is Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority.157 The late Rev. Jerry Falwell, in
response to a parody advertisement for Campari liquor featuring him that
was published in Hustler Magazine, sent out mailings to hundreds of
thousands of supporters and donors that included a copy of the parody ad
with some of the words redacted.' 5 This was done to raise money to
support Falwell's suit against Hustler, publisher Larry Flynt, and others,
alleging libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
153. Id. at *1.
154. Id.
155. Id. at *4.
156. Id at *6. Professor Samuelson categorizes this decision as an example of iterative
copying for orthogonal speech related purposes. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 2557. Cf
Dhillon v. Doe, 2014 WL 722592 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25 2014) (holding that the use of a
photo as part of an article critical of plaintiff's politics was transformative and fair
because it was used for the purpose of criticism and not identification); Katz v. Google,
Inc., 802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that the defendant's use of plaintiffs photo
in scathing blog posts critical of plaintiff was transformative, while also noting that the
use was educational and that there was no evidence of market harm). John Hannebery &
Lachlan Sadler, Davies Collison Cave, Victory for You Tubers as New York District
Court Rule "Reaction Video" is Fair Use, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Sept. 26, 2017)
(discussing reaction videos as criticism and comment-a classic form of fair use);
Andrew Levad and Jason Gordon, Reed Smith L.L.P., Judge Agrees-YouTube Mockery
Protected by Fair Use, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Oct. 17, 2017). But see, Henley v. Devore,
733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that the unauthorized use of plaintiffs
songs for political ad critical of plaintiff s opponent was not fair use due to market harm).
157. Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority, 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
158. Id at 1150.
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distress.15 9 Falwell also displayed the advertisement on his television
show. 16 0 Hustler sued, alleging that Falwell's reproduction and public
display of the ad constituted copyright infringement.161 The Ninth Circuit
eventually affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Rev. Falwell on
fair use grounds, determining that although the defendants conceded that
their use of the copies of the ad was to raise money, it was also a form of
criticism and comment-an individual's effort to rebut a copyrighted
work that contained derogatory comments. 16 2 The court explained that
"the public interest in allowing an individual to defend himself against
such derogatory personal attacks serves to rebut the presumption of
unfairness." 163
C. News Reportingl64
News reporting is also included in the preamble to section 107 as one
of several examples to "give some idea of the sort of activities the courts
might regard as fair use under the circumstances."1 65  Although
reproducing a portion of a protected work in connection with reporting
the news is traditionally regarded productive and fair,16 6 courts often
159. Id. at 1150 n.1.
160. Id. at 1149.
161. Id at 1150 n.1.
162. Id. at 1153.
163. Id At this time, commercial uses still were presumptively unfair. See Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 449-51 (1984). This decision was 2-1
with the dissent asserting that Falwell's efforts here sought to exploit the outrage in an
effort to raise money, and that this weighed heavily against fair use. Hustler Magazine,
796 F.2d at 1158-59. The Hustler decision was cited in Dhillon v. Doe, No. C 13-01465
SI, 2014 WL 722592 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (holding that defendant's use of
plaintiff's head shot photo in connection with an article critical of and commenting on
plaintiff's political view was transformative because it served the purpose of criticism
and not identification); see also Galvin v. Ill. Republican Party, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1187
(N.D. 111. 2015) (holding altered copy of photograph used for a political ad to be
transformative and fair use-not a substitute for the original). But see, Hill v. Public
Advocate of the U.S., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (D. Col. 2014) (finding unauthorized
reproduction of plaintiff's photo of a gay couple's engagement in political advertisement
critical of a candidate's views on family values not transformative and not a fair use).
163. Use for news reporting purposes also is one of Professor Samuelson's policy
clusters. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 2558-66.
164. Id
165. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 63 (1976). The listing is not exhaustive, and it is not
intended to single out a particular use as being presumptively fair. Id; see also Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 539 (1985).
166. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561.
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unnecessarily discuss the transformative use standard in cases involving
- - 167
news just as they do in cases involving comment or criticism.
In Fuentes v. Mega Media Holdings, Inc., the plaintiff was a well-
known Cuban author and journalist who, after seeking asylum in the
United States, reacquired ten to twelve hours of video footage he had
created in the late 1980s concerning activities in Angola by high ranking
members of Cuba's military. 16 8 The defendants obtained some of this
video footage from a third party in 2008, and aired portions of it on a
television show. Plaintiff sued for infringement.1 69 The court granted
summary judgment for the defendants on the strength of their fair use
defense.17  It noted, among other things, that news reporting was in
section 107's preamble, that the subject matter was of historical
importance, and that defendant's use was transformative because they
had edited plaintiff's work and added commentary.17 1 It probably would
have been sufficient to stick to the four statutory factors.
For example, an unauthorized use for news reporting can be a fair
use without being very transformative as illustrated by The Swatch
Group Management Services v. Bloomberg, L.P. 17 2 The court stated that
Bloomberg's unauthorized verbatim reproduction of a written transcript
of Swatch's conference call about its 2010 earnings report was "at least
arguably transformative."1 73 In finding fair use, the court explained that
167. Courts do this even though these uses are listed in the preamble. Moreover, it is
well established that a determination that a use is not transformative is not necessarily
fatal to a fair use defense. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
168. Fuentes v. Mega Media Holdings, Inc., No. 09-22979-CIV 2011 WL
2601356(S.D. Fla. June 9, 2011).
169. Id. at *10.
170. Id. at *51-52.
171. Id; see also Nunez v. Caribbean International News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.
2000) (holding that a newspaper's publication of professional photos of beauty pageant
winner taken for her portfolio was transformative, newsworthy and fair use because the
model was nude in one of the photos); Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Cable News
Network, Inc., No. 598 Civ. 7128-30, 2001 WL 1518264 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2001)
(holding that the use of a 20 second clip from the 1945 movie G.I. Joe in a two minute,
fifty second news report about the death of the actor who portrayed GI Joe, Robert
Mitchum, was transformative and fair use).
172. The Swatch Group Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2014), amending and superseding The Swatch Group Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg
L.P., 742 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2014).
173. Id. at 85. The court had initially said that this verbatim reproduction of the
transcript was not transformative. The Swatch Group Mgmt. Servs. Ltd., 742 F.3d at 28-
29.
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in the context of news reporting the need to convey information to the
public may require a defendant to copy an entire work. 174
Of course, the use of a work for news reporting does not guarantee a
finding of fair use as shown by Fitzgerald v. CBS Broadcasting.175 This
case concerned a dispute over a television station's unauthorized
publication of a free lance photographer's photos that had been first
published six years earlier. 17 6 The court said "[t]o determine exactly how
much transformation occurred in the [defendant's] broadcast of the photo
requires an analysis of the original, intended meaning and use of the
photo and its ultimate meaning and use on June 24-25, 2004."177 Here,
the plaintiff's photo of the arrest of a gangster in 1998 was used, slightly
cropped, in a news story about the sentencing in 2004 of a different
gangster.178 The court concluded that the only transformation in this case
was that the photo of the earlier arrest "was downgraded from breaking
news to a supplementary part of a larger story."1 79 The court, after
concluding that this commercial use was not transformative, weighed the
other fair use factors and found infringement." 0 It would have been
better for the court to say that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs old
photo of one gangster to illustrate the sentencing of another gangster was
not newsworthy and then proceed to an analysis of the four statutory fair
use factors.
There are other decisions in which news reporting was raised in
connection with a fair use defense, and the courts found infringement
after concluding that the defendant's use was neither transformative nor
fair. In Harper Collins v. Gawker, a blog's publication of twenty-one
pages from Sarah Palin's soon- to be published book was not a fair use
for several reasons including the fact that the blog copied the material to
attract readers and not for purposes of criticism, comment, or news
reporting. 181 In Monge v. Maya Magazines, the defendant's publication
of six of one hundred unpublished photographs of a celebrity wedding to
corroborate a story in a gossip magazine was "at best minimally
174. The Swatch Group Mgmt. Servs. Ltd., 756 F.3d at 85 (stating that faithful
reproduction of the transcript of the conference call served the interest of accuracy, not
piracy). The court had initially said that the secretly recorded telephone conference call
disclosed by Bloomberg included material "of critical importance to American securities
markets." Id. at 26-27.
175. Fitzgerald v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2007).
176. Id. at 180.
177. Id. at 185-86.
178. Id. at 181, 186.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 190.
181. Harper Collins v. Gawker, 721 F. Supp. 2d 303, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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transformative."18 2According to the court, the defendant published more
photos than necessary. In Balsey v. LFP, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
denial of defendant Hustler's motion for a judgment as a matter of law
regarding its publication of plaintiffs photos of her participation in a wet
T-shirt contest several years earlier.184 The magazine's use of the photos
was not transformative; they were not altered but for minor cropping,
there was no added creative message, and the defendant's purpose in
publishing the photos was the same as the original purpose; to shock,
arouse, and amuse.18 ' Likewise, reuse of news videos of the 1992 Los
Angeles riots and the beating of Reginald Denny was not transformative
where the videos were simply re-transmitted in their entirety without
comment, editing, or context. 186 Posting copyrighted news stories from
mainstream media like the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post
on defendant's bulletin board website and asking the site's visitors to
comment on the stories was neither a transformative use of the articles
nor a fair use.187 In each of these cases the courts, instead of discussing
transformativeness, might have said that the particular uses of plaintiffs'
works were not news reporting and then proceed to apply the statute's
four factors.
182. Monge v. Maya Magazinews, 688 F.3d 1164, 1176 (9th Cir. 2012).
183. Id. at 1164. The defendant did not meet its burden on fair use. Even though only
six of 100 photos were published, those six were published in their entirety. Id. at 1180;
see also BWP Media U.S.A., Inc. v. Gossip Cop Media, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 3d 395
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that defendant's use of photos and video from another gossip
site, allegedly for the purpose of comment, was not transformative).
184. Balsey v. LFP, 691 F.3d 747, 754 (6th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff, who had lost her
job as a broadcaster as a result of the earlier disclosure of some of these photographs, had
acquired the copyright on them. Id at 755.
185. Id. at 759; see also Barcroft Media, Ltd. v. Coed Media Grp., No. 16-CV-7634
(JMF), 2017 WL 5032993, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2017) (stating that defendant's
infringing use of plaintiffs' copyrighted celebrity and human interest photographs on
defendant's pop culture websites had no transformative effect because it displayed them
in the same manner and for the same purpose as they were originally intended and used).
186. Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters TV Int'l, 149 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 1998). But
see, Los Angeles News Service v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Court TV's rebroadcast of a short segment of the Denny beating in
connection with its coverage of the trial of his assailant was transformative and fair use),
amended and superseded on other grounds, 313 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
Nihon Kezai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that defendant's infringing abstracts of financial news reports were not in the
least transformative but simply direct translations of plaintiffs Japanese language
reports).
187. Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM, 2000 WL 565200
(C.D. Cal. April 4, 2000) (plaintiffs also claimed that this use of their articles could
impact the traffic on their own sites).
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News reporting, like criticism and comment, is listed in the preamble
to section 107 and was well established as a fair use before the
transformative use doctrine became so important.1 88 Here again, when an
unauthorized use is defended as being for news reporting purposes the
courts should do a straight forward fair use analysis instead of twisting
and turning to decide whether the use is transformative. The courts
should focus on whether the use was legitimate news reporting as well as
the extent of the taking and the impact of the unauthorized copying on
the market for the protected work.
D. Documentaries, Compendiums, Reference Books, and Other Uses Out
of Context
There are many fair use decisions involving unauthorized uses of
protected works out of context. By this I mean that a portion of a
protected work is used without significant modification in a setting that
is substantially different from the original author's setting-his or her
actual and intended use of the work. The use out of context thus often
"adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message" 18 9 even
though the existing work is not altered or altered only slightly.1 90 I
many of these use-out-of-context cases, courts have held that the uses
were transformative and fair. However, it is important to note that in
some of these cases only a relatively small amount of the protected work
was used, and it was relatively clear that the character or purpose of the
challenged use was significantly different from the work's original
character or purpose. 191 In my opinion, the transformative use standard
plays a useful role for courts and counsel in litigating and ultimately
deciding use out of context cases.
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd. is a good
example. 19 2 The defendant published a 480-page coffee table book in
2003 that told the story of the Grateful Dead.1 93 The story was told
chronologically, along a timeline, with over 2,000 images and
188. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
189. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. at 569, 579 (1994) (emphasis added).
190. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 73.
191. 'Purpose' in a fair use analysis is not an all-or-nothing matter. It is critical to
evaluate the extent of the comment or criticism, whether it is substantial or insignificant.
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1374 (2d Cir. 1993).
However, the cases in this category show that a transformative use need not be a critical
use. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL, supra note 3, at 866 n.5.
192. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
193. Id. at 607.
[Vol. 63:267296
A TRANSFORMATIVE USE TAXONOMY
explanatory text.1 94 Plaintiff Bill Graham Archives held the copyright on
Grateful Dead concert tour posters, and sued after substantially reduced
images of seven of these posters were included in the book without
permission.195 The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment in the
defendant's favor, agreeing with the trial court's finding that the
reproduction of the images on the book's timeline was transformative.1 96
The appellate court emphasized that the use of the images in the
biography as historical artifacts was very different from their original
purpose which was generating public interest in upcoming concerts. 97in
addition, the reproductions were in reduced size, they were displayed at
angles as part of a collage of images, and they took up no more than one-
eighth of a page on the seven pages that included the images.198
Accordingly, the first fair use factor weighed in the defendant's favor.1 99
SOFA Entertainment, Inc. v. Dodger Productions is similar.20 0 At
issue was a seven second excerpt from the January 2, 1966 broadcast of
the Ed Sullivan Show during which this famous host introduced the Four
Seasons. 201 The defendants used this clip in the popular musical, Jersey
Boys-a historical dramatization of the Four Seasons and the lives of its
members.2 02 The court stated that the film clip, shown at the end of the
play's first act,
references the Four Seasons' performance on the January 2, 1966
episode of The Ed Sullivan Show to mark an important moment
in the band's career. At that point in rock & roll history, many
American bands were pushed into obscurity by the weight of the
"British Invasion," which was kicked off by the Beatles'
performance on The Ed Sullivan Show. The Four Seasons,
however, thrived. Being selected by Ed Sullivan to perform on
his show was evidence of the band's enduring prominence in
American music. By using it as a biographical anchor, Dodger
put the clip to its own'transformative ends. 20 3
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id at 608-12.
197. Id. at 610.
198. Id. at 611-15.
199. Id. at 609-10.
200. SOFA Entm't, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., 709 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 2013).
201. Id. at 1276.
202. Id. at 1276-77.
203. Id. at 1278. The court cited the Bill Graham Archives decision, 448 F.3d 605 (2d
Cir. 2006) (discussing the Grateful Dead concert poster decision discussed infra) and
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
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To generalize from these and other 'use out of context' decisions, 204
it seems to be safe to use a small amount of a copyrighted work without
permission when the intended purpose, such as a biographical anchor, a
historical artifact, or as a jumping off point, is considerably different
from the original purpose of the work, such as entertainment or
promotion. This will likely be treated as transformative. 2' However, if
the use of television clips of Elvis in performance and on various television shows in
connection with a documentary was transformative, but affirming the trial court's ruling
that the defendant biographer likely did not use the protected material fairly given the
substantial amount of the taking); see also Corbello v. Devito, No. 2:08-cv-00867-RJC-
PAL, 2017 WL 2587924 (D. Nev. June 14, 2017) (members of the Four Seasons and the
producers of the musical Jersey Boys entitled to judgment as a matter of law against
author who assisted one of the members in writing his autobiography because all but one
of the factors favored fair use, in large part due to the transformative nature of the
musical).
204. See, e.g., Hofheinz v. A&E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (using twenty-second clip from the movie It Conquered the World in a television
biography of the actor Peter Graves held to be transformative and fair use); Warren
Publ'g Co. v. Spurlock d/b/a Vanguard Prods., 645 F. Supp 2d 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009)
(holding that the use of 24 monster and horror magazine covers created by the artist Basil
Gogos in a book that was a retrospective of the artist's career was transformative and fair
use); Monster Commc'ns v. Turner Broad. Sys., 935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that the use of two minutes of video footage in movie biography of Muhammad
Ali was fair use); Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that
defendant's photo of a graffiti covered wall with a poster of plaintiff's work-a
screaming face-as part of a video backdrop for live performances of a song was
transformative and fair use given the new content and message even though plaintiffs
protected image itself was not significantly altered); Calkins v. Playboy Enters. Int., Inc.,
561 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that defendant's use of plaintiffs high
school photo of Playboy Centerfold on a biography page was transformative and fair use
because it was in reduced size and served a different function from the original image-
to provide insight into her life).
205. See also Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D.
Mich. 1998) (holding that the use of thirty-five seconds of plaintiff's song, without lyrics,
as background music in a twenty-seven minute educational program counseling children
to avoid drugs was transformative and fair use); Nat'l Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang,
912 F. Supp. 2d 985 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (holding that defendant sports writer's use of the
plaintiff's grades for eighteen players out of hundreds of players in plaintiff's scouting
reports as a starting point for his own comments about the draft prospects for particular
players was transformative and fair use); Arrow Prods. v. Weinstein Co. LLC, 44 F.
Supp. 3d 359, 368-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding the recreation of three scenes from
famous pornographic movie Deep Throat in biographical account of the movie's star was
transformative and fair use); Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens, 619 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010)
(holding the football team's use of infringing Flying B logo in the lobby of the team's
corporate headquarters in connection with a display of tickets from the inaugural season
and photos of the team's first high draft picks was transformative since the logo was
being used for factual content but sale of highlight films containing game footage from
prior seasons when the logo was used was not fair use); Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens, 737
F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding the fleeting uses of the infringing 'Flying B' logo as
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the defendant takes a large amount from the protected work-a
substantial taking as opposed to that seven second clip of the Ed Sullivan
Show in SOFA Entertainment or those seven images of concert posters in
reduced size in Bill Graham Archives-then the defendant's use, though
transformative, might not be fair.
This proposition is illustrated by Warner Bros. Entertainment v. RDR
Books which concerned the potential publication of a print version of The
206
Harry Potter Lexicon, a free online guide to the Harry Potter series.
This book, The Lexicon, was to be encyclopedia of information from all
the Harry Potter novels and also J.K. Rowling's companion books on
207Quidditch and Fantastic Beasts. The court said that The Lexicon's use
of the Potter series had transformative elements because instead of telling
an entertaining story about the character Harry Potter and his magical
world, it "uses material from the series for the practical purpose of
making information about the intricate world of Harry Potter readily
accessible to readers in a reference guide." 2 08 However, the use of
Rowling's companion books in the The Lexicon was less
transformative. 2 09 The defendant's fair use defense was ultimately
undermined by the extensive borrowing from - the novels and the
companion books,210 and by the likelihood that publication of The
Lexicon would impair the market for derivative works that Rowling
could license. 2 11 The court stated:
factual content in connection with displays at the Ravens' stadium and in videos about
the history of the Ravens and the NFL are transformative and fair use, but use of the logo
in connection with a video game was not transformative); Faulkner Literary Rights, LLC
v. Sony Pictures Classics, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 701, 707-09 (N.D. Miss. 2013) (holding
the paraphrase of one line from Faulkner's novel Requiem for a Nun in a movie comedy
set in Paris is transformative and fair use in that the speaker, time, and place were
diametrically dissimilar plus the quote was of miniscule importance); Campinha-Bacote
v. Evansville Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., No. 3:14-cv-00056-SEB-WGH, 2015 WL
12559889 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 5, 2015). Holding the use of plaintiffs ASKED Model,
"clearly designed to be used exclusively by psychiatric nurses and similarly situated
healthcare professionals," in a the public education context was transformative and fair.
Id.
206. Warner Bros. Entm't v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 519-21 (S.D.N.Y
2008).
207. Id. at 520-22. The book was to be an A to Z guide to creatures, characters, objects
and events with over 2400 entries. Id. at 524.
208. Id. at 541. Since the book was to serve reference purposes, rather than the
entertainment or aesthetic purposes of the novels, it did not supplant those works. Id.
209. It was slightly transformative by synthesizing the material from her companion
works with the complete reference guide. Id at 542.
210. Id. at 548.
211. Id. at 551.
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In striking the balance between the property rights of original
authors and the freedom of expression of secondary authors,
reference guides to works of literature should generally be
encouraged by copyright law as they provide benefit to readers
and students; but to borrow from Rowling's overstated views,
they should not be permitted to 'plunder' the works of original
authors.212
Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video, 2 13 also ruled
against fair use after saying that defendant's use of television clips of
Elvis in live performances and on various television shows in a sixteen
hour documentary was occasionally transformative.2 14 The clips were of
varying lengths, some were filler, and others were subject to
commentary. " As in the The Lexicon litigation involving the Harry
Potter series, the defendant's borrowings were too extensive. The Ninth
Circuit stated:
In the aggregate, the excerpts comprise a substantial portion of
Elvis' total appearance on many of these shows. For example,
almost all of Elvis' appearance on The Steve Allen Show is
contained in The Definitive Elvis. Thirty-five percent of his
appearances on The Ed Sullivan Show is replayed as is three
minutes from The 1968 Comeback Special. 2 16
The fair use issue was close because many of the clips were cited as
historical reference points. 217 The entire work was biographical in nature,
going beyond entertainment to tell the story of Elvis' life.2 18 However,
many of the clips were used "in excess of this benign purpose, and ...
are simply rebroadcast for entertainment purposes that Plaintiffs
rightfully own." 2 19 The Second Circuit concluded that the district court
had not abused its discretion in weighing the fair use factors and
determining that plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits.220
212. Id. at 551. The defendant ultimately published a revised version of The Lexicon.
CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 858 n.7.
213. Elvis Presley Enters. Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003).
214. Id. at 628-29.
215. Id. at 625.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 629.
218. Id at 625.
219. Id. at 629.
220. Id. at 631.
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There were similar outcomes favoring the copyright owner in
litigation over a Godzilla compendium book that contained commentary,
critique, trivia, plot summaries and still pictures of each Godzilla film,221
a 'Seinfeld Aptitude Test' trivia quiz book that used 643 fragments about
the hit show's characters and their quirks from eighty four of the
episodes, 222 and a book summarizing in great detail the plots of episodes
of the Twin Peaks television series.223 In all of these cases, the
defendants arguably transformed copyrighted material from the
plaintiffs' works but took too much protected expression.224
However, even relatively small takings of protected work might not
be regarded as transformative if the purpose or character of the new use
is hard to differentiate clearly from the original use or purpose of the
work. A case on point is Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television
which involved the unauthorized public display for roughly thirty
seconds of a poster version of Faith Ringgold's 'Church Picnic Story
221. Toho Co. Ltd. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
222. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc. 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998);
see also Twin Peaks Prods. Inc. v. Public Int'l Ltd., 996 F. 2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993)
(retelling the stories of the Twin Peaks series in abridged versions infringed because the
plot details of the shows were in the same sequence as the original series); Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding
the use of characters, plots and dramatic episodes that make up the Star Trek series in
unauthorized 'Joy of Trek' book is not transformative and not fair use).
223. Twin Peaks Prods. Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd. 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993). Cf
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (stating the use of characters, plots and dramatic episodes from the Star Trek series
in unauthorized 'Joy of Trek' book is not transformative and not fair use); Dr. Seuss
Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix LLC, 256 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (denying motion
to dismiss infringement claim against a transformative mash-up of tropes and elements
from both Dr. Seuss works and the Star Trek franchise because the fair use elements were
in near-perfect balance); Ranieri v. Adirondack Dev. Group, 164 F. Supp. 3d 305
(N.D.N.Y. 2016) (denying summary judgment for defendant who had reproduced
plaintiffs copyright floor plans in slightly modified form for its own advertising
materials notwithstanding its argument that these plans could not be used to erect a condo
and that they educated the public).
224. Compare Greenberg v. Nat'l Geographic Soc', 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001)
with Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Enters., Inc. 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005). In the former
the modification of plaintiffs copyrighted photo so that it morphed as users navigated a
CD Rom was seen as transformative but infringing because the defendant exceeded its
license under section 201(c) while in the latter case the court concluded that defendant's
electronic replica of the original works fell within that section and the Supreme Court's
decision in Tasini v. New York Times, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); see also CRAIG JOYCE ET
AL., supra note 3, at 299. Cf Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens, 619 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010)
(infringing using the 'Flying B' logo in season highlight films is not transformative in
that the use of the logo serves the same purpose of identifying the team as it served with
the defendant first infringed the logo).
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Quilt.' 225 This occurred in a five minute scene during the television show
ROC.226 The court said that this unauthorized public display of
Ringgold's art was not for any of the purposes listed in the preamble to
section 107, and that it was not transformative because the poster was
227used for the same purpose for which it was created-to be decorative.
The defendant added nothing new.228 It used the poster to decorate the
set.229 Similarly, the unauthorized use of a photograph on an advertising
company's website for the purpose of providing examples of its work to
prospective clients was held to be outside the scope of fair use in Straus
v. DVC Worldwide, Inc. 23 0 The defendant argued that it had transformed
the photo from a portrait of a famous golfer to advertise a product to
show its ability to advertise a healthcare product; this was a portfolio use
to show it could create advertising. 231 After saying there was scant
authority on whether self-promotional materials can be fair use, the court
concluded that the transformative purpose here was slight to non-
existent. This was not fair use.232 The same result was reached in a case
involving the unauthorized and slightly altered use of a New Jersey gay
couple's engagement photograph in a mailer sent to Colorado voters that
attacked a candidate's views on gay marriage and family values. The
court held that this infringing use was not transformative. 2 3
225. Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, 126 F.3d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1997).
226. Id. The original quilt is in Atlanta's High Museum of Art.
227. Id. at 78-79.
228. Id. at 79.
229. Id. at 78-79; see also Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc. 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Mo.
2010) (holding defendant gallery's unauthorized display on its website of both high
resolution and thumbnail images of plaintiff's artwork was not fair use because the
images did not alter the art with new expression and the postings were for an
informational or promotional purpose); Hirsch v. CBS Broad. Inc., 17 Civ. 1860, 2017
WL 3393845, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017) (holding that showing a cropped version of
the plaintiff's copyrighted photograph for about two seconds on 48 Hours was not de
minimis as a matter of law, and denying defendant's motion to dismiss because the
factual record needed to be developed to determine if defendant was entitled to a fair use
defense for news reporting); Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc. 291 F. Supp. 2d 980
(D. Minn. 2003) (finding defendant's infringing use of plaintiff's copyrighted stickers in
a book to show how the stickers could be displayed was more derivative than
transformative and used the stickers for their intended purpose-to create a pictorial
representation in which the stickers would not lose their individual identities); see also
Mike Nepple, Thompson Coburn, Fair Use Blocks Out Copyright Claim Over LeBron's
Tattoo, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (June 1, 2017) (discussing the Solid Oaks v. Take Two
litigation over whether showing James' copyrighted Lion's Head tattoo in a video game
is fair use or de minimis).
230. Straus v. DVC Worldwide, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 620, 642-43 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
231. Id. at 642.
232. Id. at 643.
233. Hill v. Pub. Advocate of the U.S., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (D. Col. 2014).
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In contrast, in a case involving an unauthorized but obscured display
of plaintiffs photographs for about ninety seconds of a movie, the court
said that the defendant used the images "in furtherance of the creation of
a distinct visual aesthetic and overall mood for the moviegoer watching
the scene in the killer's apartment."234 This use was transformative and
neutralized the film's commercialism. 23 5 Similarly, in Neri v. Monroe, an
architectural design firm posted on its website photographs depicting the
entrance hallway of a condominium it had remodeled for a client. The
plaintiff artist's copyrighted blown glass sculptural work, commissioned
by the same client of the firm, was visible in these photographs.236 The
artist sued the firm and the court found fair use, saying that the two-
dimensional realistic photos of the interior space, in which the plaintiff s
sculptural work could be seen, were highly transformative of the
plaintiffs three-dimensional, impressionistic, composition of pieces of
translucent glass.237 The posting informed the public about the defendant
company's remodeling work. It was not for aesthetic purposes, and it did
not supersede the plaintiffs composition.238
There are many 'use out of context' cases in which the courts found
that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs work, sometimes without
alteration, to serve a different purpose is transformative and fair. The
most critical factors seem to be the extent of the repurposing and the
amount of the taking. The more substantial the repurposing-i.e., using a
photo from a modeling portfolio for a news report-then the less likely
that the use supersedes the original and is accordingly fair. Similarly, the
more extensive the taking, even for a new purpose, then the fair use
argument becomes harder to make.
234. Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
235. Id. See also Straus v. DVC Worldwide, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 620, 641 (S.D. Tex.
2007) (holding 'snippet' use of plaintiff's photograph of Arnold Palmer in TV ad for
Nicoroette gum for two to three seconds in the background is de minimis).
236. Neri v. Monroe, No. 11-cv-429-slc, 2012 WL 12888415 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21,
2012), vacated and remanded, 726 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2013). The website credited the
photographer but not the artist.
237. Id.
238. Id; See also Sarl Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding defendant's posting on its website of its photographs of French
plaintiff's fashion designs said to be highly transformative since the photos were images
of the designs which were posted not to market fashion but for the purpose of providing
the public with news about the fashion world); Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 862
F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding use of plaintiff's copyrighted mobile in a film
held to be fair use without a discussion of transformativeness); Kennedy v. Gish,
Sherwood & Friends, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 3d 898 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (holding defendant's use
of low resolution screenshots of plaintiff's photos from plaintiff's website in an online ad
campaign held to be transformative and fair because this use, in a different context,
served a different purposed and did not supersede plaintiff's purpose).
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E. Appropriation Art
"'Appropriation' art attempts to recontextualize famous (or not-so-
famous) images by juxtaposing them with new material." 23 9 As in the
'use out of context' cases discussed in the previous section, the owners
of copyright in appropriated images often sue for infringement, but
appropriation artists seem to win most of the time in the post-Campbell
world. However, the defendant artist needs to be able to make a plausible
argument that he or she transformed the plaintiff artist's work in a
meaningful way. 24 0
Pre-Campbell the artist Jeff Koons was unsuccessful in asserting fair
use to justify turning photographer, Art Rogers' commissioned work
"Puppies" into a three-dimensional sculptural piece. 24 1 He tried to argue
that his unauthorized derivative work was a parody of the plaintiffs
photograph but the court said that
The problem in the instant case is that even given that "String of
Puppies" is a satirical critique of our materialistic society, it is
difficult to discern any parody of the photograph "Puppies"
itself. We conclude therefore that this first factor of the fair use
doctrine cuts against a finding of fair use.242
Moreover, the behavior of the defendant artist and his gallery
suggested they believed that since "they were significant players in the
art business, and the copies they produced bettered the price of the
copied work by a thousand to one, their piracy of a less well-known
artist's work w6uld escape being sullied by an accusation of
plagiarism. 2 4 1
Over a decade after losing to Rogers, and after the Supreme Court
decided Campbell, Koons was sued by another photographer. Without
seeking permission, he scanned an advertisement for Gucci sandals from
Allure magazine. The photo in the ad, titled "Silk Sandals," had been
taken by Andrea Blanch, a well-regarded fashion photographer. Koons
altered this photo slightly as he incorporated it, along with other scanned
239. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 867.
240. See generally Peter Jaszi, Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?, 12
TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 105 (2009); Heyman, supra note 61; William M. Landes,
Copyright, Borrow Images and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 1 (2000).
241. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
242. Id. at 310.
243. Id. at 304.
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images, against a pastoral background as part of a collage.244 Koons said
he used the image as part of his commentary on the social and aesthetic
consequences of mass media-purposes very different from the
plaintiff's advertising photo for Allure. The photo was raw material for
his distinct creative objectives. 24 5 The court stated that the test for
determining whether Koons' use of Blanch's photograph was
transformative
is to see whether the new work "merely supersedes the objects of
the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message." .. . The test almost perfectly
describes Koons's adaptation of "Silk Sandals": the use of a
fashion photograph created for publication in a glossy American
"lifestyles" magazine-with changes of its colors, the
background against which it is portrayed, the medium, the size of
the objects pictured, the objects' details and, crucially, their
entirely different purpose and meaning-as part of a massive
painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery
space. We therefore conclude that the use in question was
246transformative.
Koons' victory in his use of the fashion photograph is reconcilable
with his earlier defeat for making an unauthorized sculpture based upon
the commissioned photograph of the couple holding a litter of puppies. It
is easy to say that Campbell was decided in between the two decisions
with the Supreme Court announcing the transformative use standard but
the cases are distinguishable as explained by a concurring opinion in
Blanch v. Koons:
244. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247-48 (2d Cir. 2006)
Koons scanned the image of 'Silk Sandals' into his computer and incorporated
a version of the scanned image into 'Niagara.' He included in the painting only
the legs and feet from the photograph, discarding the background of the
airplane cabin and the man's lap on which the legs rest. Koons inverted the
orientation of the legs so that they dangle vertically downward above the other
elements of 'Niagara' rather than slant upward at a 45-degree angle as they
appear in the photograph. He added a heel to one of the feet and modified the
photograph's coloring. The legs from 'Silk Sandals' are second from the left
among the four pairs of legs that form the focal images of 'Niagara.'
Id.
245. Id. at 252.
246. Id (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
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I agree that Koons' work is highly transformative of Blanch's,
using it as raw material for an entirely different type of art, and
that his use of Blanch's work furthered a purpose (art that
comments on existing images by juxtaposing them against
others) that can make a finding of fair use appropriate. In both
respects, the facts of this case are quite distinguishable from
those of Rogers v. Koons, . . . in which Koons slavishly recreated
a copyrighted work in a different medium without any objective
indicia of transforming it or commenting on the copyrighted
work. 247
Mattel v. Walking Mountain Products 2 48and Cariou v. Prince 249
also fair use decisions which can be categorized as appropriation art
cases. Both are consistent with Blanch v. Koons with their respective
courts finding fair use. The Mattel decision, involving photographs of the
toy manufacturer's iconic doll 'Barbie,' is often treated as a parody
case.250 The defendant photographer, Thomas Forsythe
developed a series of 78 photographs entitled 'Food Chain
Barbie,' in which he depicted Barbie in various absurd and often
sexualized positions. . . . While his works vary, Forsythe
generally depicts one or more nude Barbie dolls juxtaposed with
vintage kitchen appliances. For example, "Malted Barbie"
features a nude Barbie placed on a vintage Hamilton Beach malt
machine. "Fondue a la Barbie" depicts Barbie heads in a fondue
pot. "Barbie Enchiladas" depicts four Barbie dolls wrapped in
2511tortillas and covered with salsa in a casserole dish in a lit oven.
The Ninth Circuit had no difficulty determining that Forsythe's
photos had turned the image of Barbie on her head, displaying her nude,
sometimes frazzled, and posed in ridiculous and often dangerous
situations. He had transformed the doll's meaning, and his commentary
247. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 262 (R. Katzmann, concurring). The concurring opinion also
states, "that Blanch failed to show that Koons' use of her work actually harmed her in
any way. She thus stands in stark contrast to the plaintiff in Rogers, for whom licensing
of his work in general, and the appropriated work in particular, yielded considerable
revenue." Id.
248. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
249. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2nd Cir. 2013).
250. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 841; Mattel, 353 F.3d at 800-03.
251. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 796.
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about gender roles and the position of women in society was readily
apparent.252
The appropriation artist Richard Prince, the defendant in Cariou v.
Prince,253 used over sixty photographs from Patrick Cariou's book Yes
Rasta. This book contains portrait and landscape photos of Jamaica and
the Rastafarians who live there. Prince altered these photographs and
incorporated them into a series of thirty paintings and collages. Cariou
sued Prince and a gallery for copyright infringement, and the lower court
ruled in the plaintiffs favor but the Court of Appeals reversed as to
twenty-five of the works, concluding that Prince's uses were
transformative and fair.254 The appellate court said that the trial court was
mistaken in concluding that a work could not be considered
transformative unless it commented on the original as with parody.
The law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the
original or its author in order to be considered transformative,
and a secondary work may constitute a fair use even if it serves
some purpose other than. those (criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research) identified in the
preamble to the statute.25 5
Regarding twenty-five of the thirty allegedly infringing works, the
court said that they
manifest an entirely different aesthetic from Cariou's
photographs. Where Cariou's serene and deliberately composed
portraits and landscape photographs depict the natural beauty of
Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, Prince's crude and
jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and provocative.
Cariou's black-and-white photographs were printed in a 9 1/2" x
12" book. Prince has created collages on canvas that incorporate
color, feature distorted human and other forms and settings, and
measure between ten and nearly a hundred times the size of the
photographs. Prince's composition, presentation, scale, color
palette, and media are fundamentally different and new
252. Id. at 802.
253. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 694.
254. Idat 698. In respect to the remaining five works, the case was remanded to the
trial court to determine fair use in accordance with the correct test.
255. Id. at 706.
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compared to the photographs, as is the expressive nature of
Prince's work.256
As with the decisions summarized in the 'use out of context'
category, one of the lessons from the appropriation artist cases is that an
artist's unauthorized use of another's protected work is less likely to be
regarded as transformative if the alterations of the work are relatively
minor and the extent of the appropriation is substantial. This might cause
the court to say that the defendant's use lacks any expression, meaning or
257
message that is different from the copied work's original expression.
Jeff Koons' three-dimensional reproduction of Art Rogers' photo of a
couple holding a litter of puppies can be seen as nothing more than an
unauthorized derivative work-taking a two-dimensional photograph and
making it into a three-dimensional sculptural work,258 while his alteration
of Blanch's fashion photograph and Prince's alterations of Cariou's
photographs were dramatic and substantial.25 9 Another illustration of
taking too much protected expression and not making sufficient
alterations to the protected work is Morris v. Young in which an artist
made some changes to plaintiffs photographs of the Sex Pistols,
including Johnny Rotten and Sid Vicious, through cropping, adding tint
and changing the medium. 2 60 The court said these were minor alterations
that added only marginal artistic innovation, and were not
transformative.2 61
256. Id But see Graham v. Prince, 15-Cv-10160(SHS), 2017 WL 3037535 (S.D.N.Y.
July 18, 2017) (holding Richard Prince's alterations to plaintiff's Instagram photograph
were insignificant and not transformative thus weighing against finding of fair use); Jesse
Brody, Manatt Phelps & Phillips, LLP, Copyright Suit Requires Fair Use Analysis,
AIPLA NEWssTAND (Aug. 3, 2017) (discussing the court's refusal to dismiss suit against
Richard Prince in part because his use did not demonstrate a sufficient transformation of
Graham's photograph).
257. See, e.g., Morris v. Young, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1085-86 (C.D. Cal. 2013);
Graham v. Prince, 15-Cv-10160(SHS), 2017 WL 3037535 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017).
258. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
259. See also Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding
Defendant's substantial altered version of the photograph of the Mayor of Madison,
Wisconsin that was placed on t-shirts and tank tops along with a political message
protesting a decision by the Mayor was transformative and fair).
260. Morris, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 1081-82.
261. Id. at 1084-86. One photo was cropped to frame the subjects and then tinted in a
deep red. The second photo was printed using black enamel on an acrylic background.
See also Morris v. Guetta, No. LA CV12-00684 JAK (RZx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15556 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013). Defendant's works still were pictures of Sid Vicious
making the same distinct facial expressions depicted in plaintiff's photo plus there was no
commentary on plaintiffs work. See also N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Jeanine Pirro &
Fox News Network, LLC, 74 F. Supp. 3d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding defendant's use
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The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reached an analogous
result in Gaylord v. United States.2 62 The plaintiff sculptor owns the
copyright on "The Column;" the Korean War Veterans Memorial in
Washington D.C. that depicts a platoon of nineteen soldiers walking in
formation. 263 A photograph of fourteen of the life-size soldiers, dusted
with snow, was adapted by the Postal Service as a stamp without the
sculptor's permission.2 64 The court, in ruling against fair use, concluded
that the stamp was not transformative because it reflected no purpose or
commentary beyond that of the memorial itself.265 Both comment on the
Korean War.266 The stamp added snow and muted colors, but it did not
alter the character of the protected work.26 7 Minimal alterations coupled
with a use or purpose similar to the plaintiffs original use or purpose
might not be regarded as transformative.26 8
Digital sampling cases also fit into this category. With sampling
several seconds of a popular recording are reproduced and used without
permission in another artist's recording.26 In One major case the
defendants argued that their use of George Clinton's classic 'Atomic
on its website of plaintiff's iconic photograph of firefighters raising the American flag at
the ruins of the World Trade Center juxtaposed with the iconic WWII photo of the flag
being raised on Iwo Jima was not transformative); Graham v. Prince, 15 -Cv- 10160(SHS),
2017 WL 3037535 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) (holding Richard Prince's appropriation by
screenshot of plaintiff's Instagram post of a photograph would not be seen as
transformative because the changes he made to the work were insignificant with minor
cropping and a comment).
262. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1371.
265. Id. at 1376.
266. Id at 1381.
267. Id. at 1373-74. Cf Reyes v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D.P.R.
2009) (holding photograph of plaintiffs glass sculpture included in advertisement
intended to raise public awareness about rheumatoid arthritis and treatment options was
minimally transformative and not a fair use since there were no comments about the
sculpture in the ad and the sculpture was still presented to the viewer as a work of art);
Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding presentation of plaintiffs
copyrighted eye-wear in clothing ad not transformative nor fair use because it was worn
in the ad as intended-as eye jewelry); Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc. 126
F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding unauthorized use of poster of plaintiff's copyrighted
story quilt as decoration that is displayed as part of the set for a television show was not
transformative because it was used for the same decorative purpose as the original).
268. See, e.g., Erickson Prods. v. Kast, No. 5:13-cv-05472 HRL, 2014 WL 5474741
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2014) (holding defendant's copying and using on its own website
photos from a Wells Fargo site that plaintiff had licensed to Wells Fargo was not
transformative).
269. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 272-73
(6th Cir. 2009) (discussing how George Clinton's classic Atomic Dog was sampled by
hip hop and rap artists).
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Dog' in the recording 'D.O.G. in Me" was fair use.270 The Sixth Circuit
acknowledged that this use was transformative given its different theme,
mood and tone. However, after weighing the other fair use factors, it
determined that a jury's finding that this was not fair use was not against
the great weight of the evidence. 2 71 In contrast, the Southern District of
New York held that Drake's use of thirty-five seconds of sampled lyrics
from a one minute record was transformative and fair because Drake had
fundamentally altered the message of the plaintiffs composition.2 72
Courts are still divided whether and when sampling constitutes
273infringement.
The transformative use standard is useful in analyzing and deciding
appropriation art cases as in the many 'use out of context' cases
discussed in the previous section. Here also the courts often hold that a
defendant artist's use of another's artist's work, sometimes without
significant alteration, to serve a different purpose is transformative and
fair. The most critical factors also seem to be the clarity or obviousness
of the defendant's new message he or she is making with the first artist's
work and the amount of the taking. The more substantial the
repurposing-i.e., photographs of Barbie posed in kitchen appliances or
reduced scale images of advertising posters on timelines in a book-the
less likely that the use supersedes the original and is accordingly fair.
Similarly, the more extensive the amount of taking, even for a new
purpose, then the fair use argument becomes harder to make.
F. Transformative Uses and Technology
The Supreme Court and the lower courts grappled with whether
certain uses of copyrighted works made possible by advancements in
technology were fair use long before the transformative use doctrine was
announced in Campbell. Of course, what was a major technological
change in the 1970s often seems archaic in 2 1st Century. In my opinion,
270. Id.
271. Id. at 278. The plaintiffs' work was creative, the taking was recognizable although
small, and the plaintiff could lose substantial licensing revenues from such unauthorized
uses.
272. Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Records, 253 F. Supp. 3d 737 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Drake had a license to use the sound recording but not the composition-it had not been
registered with the Copyright Office.
273. Compare Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003) (de mimis applied to
sampling of a three-note sequence from a musical work where the sound recording had
been licenses) With Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir.
2005) (any sampling is per se an infringement).
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the transformative use standard is not especially useful in most of these
cases.
1. Photocopying
Photocopying was a major concern in the 1960s and 1970s. The
leading decision before the passage of the 1976 Act was Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States in which publishers of scientific journals
challenged the photocopying practices at the National Institutes of Health
and the National Library of Medicine.274 In a 4-3 decision, the Court of
Claims held that the photocopying should be considered a fair use
because: these federal nonprofit institutions were devoted solely to the
advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge, both institutions
normally restricted copying on an individual scientist's request to a
single copy of an article and to articles of less than fifty pages, there has
been copying of protected works by libraries ever since the 1909 Act was
adopted, medical science would be seriously hurt if such photocopying
were stopped, and there was no showing of economic injury to
plaintiff.2 75
Congress passed the 1976 Act not long after the Williams & Wilkins
decision, and the preamble to section 107 includes the following critical
language: "reproduction in copies . . . for purposes such as . . . teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright." 2 76 Publishers had little success
challenging institutional copying practices at schools, colleges and
universities due to this language in section 107 and the fact that most
educational institutions generally adhered to copying practices that fell
within a safe harbor provided by the so-called Classroom Guidelines for
Educational Photocopying.277 The notable exception was a case that was
274. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by
an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). These defendants had subscriptions to the
journals published by the plaintiffs. The practice was to photocopy and distribute articles
to scientists and researchers who requested them, but usually no more than one article per
journal, no more than fifty pages, and only a single article per request. CRAIG JOYCE ET
AL., supra note 3, at 875.
275. Williams, 487 F.2d at 1357-63. In addition, the court said that there was doubt
about the coverage of 'copy' in the Act, and it also noted that the Copyright Act was
being revised. In addition, it discussed practices overseas.
276. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
277. The fair use guidelines are found in the legislative history for the 1976 Act. They
were endorsed by some proprietor and user groups as a reasonable interpretation of the
minimum standards of fair use. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 72 (1976).
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settled with New York University in 1983.278 In addition, the Supreme
Court acknowledged in Campbell that an "obvious statutory exception to
this focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple
copies for classroom distribution." 2 79
However, the publishing industry enjoyed some success challenging
the reproduction of course packs and anthologies at off-campus, for
profit, copy shops. These materials were reproduced for purchase by
students. The fair use defense did not succeed in large part because of the
commercial nature of copy shops' activities.2 80 In addition, several courts
determined that the alleged infringers' uses of the protected materials for
the same intrinsic purposes as intended by the copyright owners were
strong indicia against fair use. 2 81 Today a court might state,
unnecessarily, that these copying practices are not transformative.
Reproduction and distribution for educational purposes utilizing
digital technology instead of the photocopier took center stage in the
infringement claims asserted by several publishers against the electronic
course reserve practices at the Georgia State University libraries making
excerpts from academic books available online to students enrolled in
particular courses.282 In holding that many of defendant Georgia State's
practices were fair use, the trial court said that the language of
section 107 and the Campbell decision compelled a finding that factor
one favored fair use.283 It stated that:
278. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 875-76, (citing and discussing Addison-
Wesley Publ. v. N.Y. Univ., 82 civ-8333(ADS), 1983 WL 1134 (S.D.N.Y. May 31,
1983).
279. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
280. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc); Blackwell Publ., Inc. v. Excel Research Grp., LLC, 661 F. Supp. 2d 786
(E.D. Mich. 2009); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
281. Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1993); Jartech v. Clancy, 666 F.
2d 403 (5th Cir. 1982); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 969
(9th Cir. 1981); see also Iowa State Univ. Res. Found. v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57 (2nd Cir.
1980). The scope of fair use is constricted when the original and the copy serve the same
function. This same function test is addressed in the House of Representatives' 1967
Report, specifically in relation to classroom materials. The Report states that, with
respect to the fair use doctrine, "[t]extbooks and other material prepared primarily for the
school market would be less susceptible to reproduction for classroom use than material
prepared for general public distribution." H.R. REP. No. 83, 10th Cong. 1st Sess. 33, 34
(1967).
282. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012), rev'd,
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014), on remand, Cambridge
Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE, 2016 WL 3098397 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31,
2016). Even though the suit was filed in 2008, there was no published opinion until 2012.
283. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
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[t]his case involves making copies of excerpts of copyrighted
works for teaching students and for scholarship, as specified in
the preamble of § 107. The use is for strictly nonprofit
educational purposes as specified in § 107(1). The fact that the
copying is done by a nonprofit educational institution leaves no
doubt on this point.284
In response to the contention that factor one favored the publishers
because the uses were not transformative, the court repeated the
statement from Campbell that "[t]he obvious statutory exception to this
focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple
copies for classroom distribution." 2 85 The lower court also concluded that
the second factor favored the defendants because the works were
nonfiction; it went with a ten percent presumption on factor three; and, it
found that factor four favored the plaintiffs when there was a reasonably
priced, readily available license for the excerpts. Since three of the four
factors weighed in defendant GSU's favor, the court found fair use. 28 6
This decision was reversed and remanded by the Eleventh Circuit
which found fault with the lower court's methodology of using bright
line rules and a formula. The court agreed that the first factor favored fair
use, and it emphasized that fair use must be conducted on a flexible, case
by case basis. * On remand, the lower court found that the vast majority
of Georgia State's practices were fair (forty-four of forty-eight) after
going through a more flexible evaluation as mandated by the Court of
Appeals. It is important to note that before analyzing each of the forty-
eight alleged instances of infringement, the court made the following
statement:
In the fair use analyses for the various claims which follow,
factor one ("the purpose and character of the use") will
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1224-25 (quoting in full Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 579 (1994)). In essence, there was no need for the court to discuss the transformative
use standard, let alone stretch it out of shape to accommodate this kind of unauthorized
reproduction of protected works for learning and educational purposes. The post-
Campbell emphasis on transformative uses seems to ignore the Betamax decision and the
Court's recognition that verbatim copying of a work for personal use is fair. Twisting and
pushing a particular use to say it is transformative is one thing, but courts must not ignore
or forget that there is often social value to copying a work verbatim for personal use. See
generally Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
286. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1242-43; Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-
CV-1425-ODE, 2016 WL 3098397 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2016).
287. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).
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uniformly favor fair use because all uses were strictly of a
nonprofit educational character for the sole purpose of teaching
students in classes at a nonprofit educational institution,
notwithstanding the nontransformative nature of the use. This
outcome will be stated summarily in each fair use analysis to
avoid repetition.288
In summary, even though the defendants' digital reserve practices
were not transformative, the first factor tipped in their favor, and most of
the practices were held to be fair.
It is difficult to find anything transformative about photocopying,
scanning, or otherwise digitally reproducing a copyrighted work, and this
was acknowledged in a post-Campbell copy shop case. A court said that
transformation was indiscernible in materials reproduced for a course
pack; verbatim copying of ninety-five pages from a 316-page book does
not transform the ninety-five pages "even if you juxtapose them to
excerpts from other works and package everything conveniently. This
kind of mechanical 'transformation' bears little resemblance to the
creative metamorphosis accomplished by the parodists in the Campbell
case."2 89  Nevertheless, some courts continue to discuss the
transformative use standard in photocopying cases, and occasionally
conclude that the secondary use is transformative when it is for a
substantially different purpose than that of the original work.2 90
Transformativeness in connection with photocopying was discussed
in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.291 in which eighty-three
publishers of scientific and technical journals claimed that the
unauthorized reproduction of their articles at Texaco's research library
was copyright infringement. The library subscribed to these journals, and
copies were made for the oil company's applied researchers. Texaco
288. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE, 2016 WL 3098397 at
*9 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2016).
289. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381,1389 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
290. See, e.g., American Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC, No. 3:12-CV-1230-M., 2013
WL 6242843 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013) (holding that an intellectual property law firm's
practice of making copies of academic and scientific articles relevant to the technology
implicated by patent application it submits to the Patent Office, and for use by attorneys
in preparing applications and advising clients, was regarded as transformative); Lucent
Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242 (D. Del. 1998) (holding
that reproduction of plaintiffs letter as part of a survey done in connection with
trademark litigation is fair use-transformative use not discussed but the court
emphasized that the defendant used the letter for a different purpose than the original).
291. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
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claimed that this copying was fair use.292 The parties stipulated to have
the court analyze the photocopying of one scientist, chosen at random,
for purposes of an initial trial limited to the issue of whether Texaco's
photocopying was fair use. The District Court, after considering all the
factors in section 107, held that the defendant's copying, as represented
by eight articles the scientist had photocopied, was not fair.293 The court
of appeals affirmed.
The appellate court's discussion of transformative use was
thoughtful and thorough.294 It stated:
To the extent that the secondary use involves merely an
untransformed duplication, the value generated by the secondary
use is little or nothing more than the value that inheres in the
original. Rather than making some contribution of new
intellectual value and thereby foster the advancement of the arts
and sciences, an untransformed copy is likely to be used simply
for the same intrinsic purpose as the original, thereby providing
limited justification for a finding of fair use.2 95
Texaco had argued that reproducing a journal article in a form more
easily used in a scientist's lab was transformative, but the court
disagreed. The copy "merely transforms the material object embodying
the intangible article that is the copyrighted original work." 2 96 The court
acknowledged that the photocopied articles were in a useful format and
had some independent value, but that the primary archival purpose of the
reproduction tipped the first factor against Texaco.29 7 However, the court
also emphasized that it was not dealing with the
292. Id. at 915.
293. Id. at 914-16.
294. Id at 922-24 (agreeing with the lower court that Texaco's copying was not
transformative).
295. Id. at 923.
296. Id. (emphasis added). There is a dissenting opinion in which it is asserted that
research by a Texaco scientist should be treated the same as theoretical research by a
chemistry professor at a university-a fair use. Id. at 933-34 (Jacobs, J., dissenting); see
also Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding repackaging of excerpts from copyrighted works in anthology
form is not transformative); Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, 271 F. Supp. 737,
748-49 (D. Md. 2003) (holding defendant's reproduction of plaintiff s market report for
distribution within its marketing department served to exploit the report for defendant's
commercial benefit for the price of one subscription, supplanting the normal market for
the report was not a fair use). Transformative use was not discussed.
297. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923-24 (2d Cir. 1994)
(discussing that the photocopy was easier to use than as part of a bulky journal, it was
more amenable to marking, and it was easy to replace if damaged). Id. at 920. The
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question of copying by an individual, for personal use in
research or otherwise (not for resale), recognizing that under the
fair use doctrine or the de minimis doctrine, such a practice by an
individual might well not constitute infringement. In other
words, our opinion does not decide the case that would arise if
[the Texaco scientist] were a professor or an independent
scientist engaged in copying and creating files for independent
research, as opposed to being employed by an institution in the
pursuit of his research on the institution's behalf.29 8
This statement acknowledges that photocopying scientific articles
was a fair use in Williams & Wilkins v. United States as well as the
proposition that many personal uses of copyrighted materials, like
making a copy of a recorded performance and copying a television show
for later viewing, are regarded as fair.29 9 There is nothing transformative
about re-recording a recorded musical performance or recording a
television show. However, the reach of this personal use exemption
beyond the facts of Sony is now uncertain, perhaps due to the post-
Campbell emphasis on the transformative use standard.3 00
The perceived need to find a transformative use to justify finding fair
use has caused some courts to focus on the nature or purpose of
defendant's use of exact copies instead of sticking with the proposition
that there is nothing transformative about a verbatim reproduction of a
work and evaluating the four statutory factors. For example, in American
existence of an established system for licensing the rights to make photocopies worked
against Texaco on the fourth fair use factor. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 871.
In essence, Texaco should have paid for more subscriptions or for a license to make
copies. Its library is not the same as a university's research library.
298. Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 916. See, e.g, Am. Inst. of Physics v.
Winstead PC, No. 3:12-CV-1230-M., 2013 WL 6242843 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013). An
intellectual property law firm's practice of making copies of academic and scientific
articles before submitting them to the Patent Office was transformative.
299. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 878 (discussing home audio recording as
well as the impact of the decision in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
300. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 879-80 (discussing peer to peer file sharing
and the Grokster decision in which the Supreme Court assumed that downloading sound
recordings for personal use was not a fair use, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913 (2005), and Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holding, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d
Cir. 2008) in which the court treated a viewer's decision to record a program using the
defendant's remote storage technology as indistinguishable from a viewer's decision to
record a program using a VCR-a permissible personal use under Sony Corp. ofAm., 464
U.S. 417).
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Institute of Physics v. Winstead PC,3 01 publishers of scientific journals
challenged an intellectual property law firm's practice of copying
academic and scientific articles relevant to technology implicated by
patent applications and submitting those copies to the Patent Office along
with the applications. 302 The court concluded that this use of exact copies
of the articles was transformative because the firm was not using the
articles as a subscriber or reader, but to provide "a background context
for patent examiners in their analysis of patent applications."30 3 It also
said that the articles were analyzed by the defendants "to determine if
they are relevant to the invention they seek to patent for their client. In
this sense, defendants read the articles not to learn the scientific material
contained therein, but to identify whether the article discusses scientific
information related to the client's potential patent." 30 4
Similarly, the selection of briefs, memoranda and other court
documents by Lexis and West for inclusion, in a database was seen as
transformative in White v. West Publishing Corp.o30 An attorney who had
been removed as counsel registered the copyrights on his previously filed
motions and memoranda, fearing that new counsel might use his work
product.306 These court documents had been filed electronically using
PACER and this made them publicly available online as well as in the
clerk's office. They were then selected by defendants West and Lexis for
inclusion in their online subscription databases so White sued for
copyright infringement.30 7  The court ruled that including these
documents in the databases was fair. Regarding transformativeness, the
court explained that White created the documents to provide legal
services and to secure a specific legal outcome, while the defendants
used the documents for the purpose of creating an interactive legal
301. Ame. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC, No. 3:12-CV-1230-M., 2013 WL
6242843 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013).
302. Id.
303. Id
304. Id. The court also said that it is not merely the content of the article that matters,
but its existence in the literature. They "establish the state of the industry at a particular
point in time" and are used as "evidence supporting a quasi-judicial decision." Id.
305. White v. West Publ'g Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
306. Edward White, an attorney serving as class counsel in a suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, filed a motion for summary judgment and a
brief in support of that motion, but midway through this litigation he was removed as
class counsel and the class was decertified. New counsel was appointed so Mr. White,
fearing that this new counsel might use his work product, registered copyrights on his
previously filed motion and memorandum. Id. at 397.
307. Id. at 398.
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research tool.3 0 8 Moreover, the court said that Lexis and West added
something new through the process of reviewing, coding, converting,
linking, and identifying documents, and this gave their unauthorized uses
a further purpose or different character. 30 9
Notwithstanding the emphasis in some cases on the defendants'
transformative purposes for using exact copies, the making of a
complete, verbatim copy of a work for a use or purpose which is not
listed in section 107 often will be considered infringing regardless of the
technology used to reproduce the work. In Associated Press v. Meltwater
United States Holdings, Inc. the AP went after an Internet news clipping
service that used web crawlers to create daily email reports for its
customers containing excerpts from AP's online articles.310 The
defendant argued that its use of the AP's articles was fair because it
functioned as a search engine for its subscribers in response to their
inquiries.3" The court disagreed, finding nothing transformative about
Meltwater's undiluted use of AP's protected news stories.3 12 It took the
'lede' or opening text, to convey the heart of the stories without adding
any commentary or insight.313
In Capital Records LLC v. ReDigi the defendant's online
marketplace for the resale of digital music files was held to violate
plaintiffs' reproduction rights and fall well outside the bounds of fair
use.3 14 Uploading to and downloading from ReDigi's server was not
transformative because those acts coupled with the sale of digital music
files added nothing new, with a further purpose or a different character,
to the protected works. 315
308. Id. at 399 (citing Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 224, 251 (2d Cir. 2006)) for the
proposition that the sharply different objectives of the parties in creating and using the
work confirms the transformative nature of the use.
309. Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). The
second fair use factor also favored fair use, the third factor was neutral, and the fourth
factor also favored fair use since there was no secondary market and the plaintiff
admitted he had lost no clients as a result of defendants' usage.
310. AP v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
311. Id. at 541.
312. Id. at 556-57.
313. Id The defendant copied between 4.5% and 61% of the articles. See also Infinity
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding defendant Dial Up's
retransmission of plaintiffs radio broadcasts to paying subscribers over the telephone
was not transformative because it left the character of the original broadcast unchanged
and it was not a fair use).
314. Capital Records, LL.C. v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
315. Id at 653-54. The court did not agree that ReDigi's facilitation of resale of digital
files was for personal use because ReDigi and the uploading user profit from the resale of
a digital music file, and the downloader saves on the price of the song in the real market.
All the fair use factors worked against ReDigi. See also Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network,
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Similarly, in Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh the sale
and rental of copyrighted movies that had been edited to remove sex,
profanity and violence was held to infringe.3 16 The entities that edited the
movies to make them more appropriate for family home viewing raised
fair use, asserting a public policy test that they were "criticizing the
objectionable content commonly found in current movies and that the
were providing more socially acceptable viewing alternatives."3 17 The
court rejected this argument. It said it was not free to assess the social
value of the movies, but that it was appropriate to protect the creators'
rights.3 A more recent decision involving a similar service to remove
objectionable material concluded that the defendant's use of plaintiffs'
works was not fair because the edited works served the "same intrinsic
entertainment value that is protected by Plaintiffs' copyrights" and is not
transformative. 3 19
L.L.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Defendant Dish Network's AutoHop
quality assurance technology infringes plaintiff's reproduction right and is neither
transformative nor a fair use. But, a preliminary injunction was denied because the harm
to the plaintiff was not irreparable in nature, but economic, given Dish Network's efforts
to compete with Hulu, Netflix, and iTunes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the
preliminary injunction because Fox did not show irreparable harm. The court assumed
that the lower court ruling was correct. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 723
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). On remand the trial court ruled that AutoHop did not infringe
by merely skipping ads, but that the quality assurance copies were not transformative and
infringed-the copies did not alter the original works with new expression, meaning or
message. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 160 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
316. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006).
Clean Flicks bought DVDs, made digital copies of them on the hard drive of a computer
after overcoming content scrambling protection, made edits, and then downloaded the
edited master copy for sale to the public. Id. at 1238; see also Disney Enters. v.
VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (holding defendant's service in
which customers can choose objectionable material to remove from films,
notwithstanding the edits made by users, is not transformative because the defendant's
use of plaintiffs films still serves the same intrinsic entertainment value).
317. Clean Flicks of Colo. LLC, 433 F.:Supp. 2d at 1240.
318. Id During the pendency of this case Congress passed the Family Movie Act of
2005 that amended section 110 of the Copyright Act to provide an exemption for editing
movies by a member of a private household if no fixed copy of the altered version is
created. Id.
319. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 973 (C.D. Cal. 2016),
affd, 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Jodi Benassi, McDermot Will & Emery, No
Fairytale Ending for Unauthorized Movie Streaming, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Sept. 28,
2017) (discussing the Ninth Circuit's decision); Mark Sableman, Thompson Coburn, 9th
Circuit's VidAngel Decision Vindicates Lawful Filtering Service, AIPLA NEWSSTAND
(Sept. 12, 2017) (discussing how the ruling against VidAngel vindicated the efforts of
ClearPlay to push for the passage of the Family Movie Act of 2005). VidAngel has
subsequently modified its service in an effort to comply with that statute. See VidAngel's
Copyright Fight with Disney, Time Warner Grow, 94 BNA PTCJ 1300 (Sept. 15, 2017).
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The Meltwater, ReDigi, and Clean Flicks disputes involve online
technology, the web, and sophisticated reproduction devices but they are
still relatively straightforward examples of unauthorized copying which
are difficult to defend as fair use. The courts discuss whether defendants'
uses of the plaintiffs' works were transformative but it would have been
relatively easy in each case for the court to stick with a straightforward
analysis of the four factors in section 107. The transformative use
standard is not needed to help courts and counsel argue and resolve these
relatively clear instances of verbatim reproduction of copyrighted works
for a variety of purposes-some for education, research, or other
productive purposes, and others primarily for commercial gain.
2. Copying and Reverse Engineering
To write a computer program, such as one for a video game, that will
run on another company's game platform, it is necessary to reverse
engineer or decompile the computer program(s) for the platform. The
reverse engineering or decompiling process requires, as its first step,
copying the entire game platform program(s). 3 20  This kind of
intermediate copying violates the reproduction right,32 1 but several courts
have held that this is a fair use.
The leading reverse engineering case, decided before Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose, is Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc. 32 2 Accolade wanted to
create video games which would be compatible with Sega's Genesis
video game console so it decompiled several of Sega's copyrighted video
games to figure out how they interacted with the game console. It then
made several compatible games and was sued for infringement. 3 23 The
court recognized that the copying required to decompile the programs
violated the Sega's reproduction right, but found fair use after a close
examination of the four factors in section 107. Regarding the first factor,
the court acknowledged that Accolade's use was commercial but there
was no evidence that it was attempting to avoid its own creative work
because the games it released for play on Se a's Genesis console had
already been developed for other hardware. Although Accolade's
ultimate purpose was making compatible games,
320. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 881-82.
321. See, e.g., Walker v. Univ. Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1979); Walt
Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871, 875-76 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
322. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
323. Id. at 1514-15.
324. Id. at 1522.
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its direct purpose in copying Sega's code, and thus its direct use
of the copyrighted material, was simply to study the functional
requirements for Genesis compatibility so that it could modify
existing games and make them usable with the Genesis console. .
. . no other method of studying those requirements were
available to Accolade. On these facts, we conclude Accolade
copied . . . for a legitimate, essentially non-exploitative purpose,
and that the commercial aspect of its use can best be described as
of minimal significance.32 5
Had Sega been decided today instead of in 1992, it is likely that the
court would say that this reproduction of the program in connection with
decompiling or reverse engineering is transformative. It might emphasize
that "[t]he use of a copyrighted work need not alter or augment the work
to be transformative in nature. Rather, it can be transformative in
function or purpose without altering or actually adding to the original
work."
326
This statement was made in a Fourth Circuit decision concerning an
online system that downloads and archives student papers to perform a
digital comparison for detecting plagiarism.327 Student authors of the
downloaded papers and essays alleged that this plagiarism detection
system infringed. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendant on the infringement claim, finding fair use.328 The court of
appeals affirmed, saying that the defendant's use of the papers and essays
"had an entirely different function and purpose than the original works;
the fact that there was no substantive alteration to the work does not
preclude the use from being transformative in nature." 3 29
325. Id. at 1533-23; Cf Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding deprocessing of lawfully purchased computer chips to
understand the functioning of a game manufacturer's security program is a fair use, but
the program that Atari eventually made to fit Nintendo's lock was substantially similar to
Nintendo's program); DSC Comms. Corp. v. Pulse Comms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (rejecting a Sega-based fair use defense).
326. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009).
327. Id at 634. Schools and colleges subscribe to the defendant's service and then
require their students to submit their written assignments through an integration between
the defendant's system and the school's course management system. Id.
328. The lower court said that the system's use (digital archiving) of the papers to
prevent plagiarism and to protect students' works from being plagiarized was highly
transformative. Id. at 638.
329. Id. at 639; See also Oracle Am., Inc. v. Terix Comput. Co., No. 5:13-cv-03385-
PSG, 2015 WL 1886968 (N.D. Cal. April 24, 2015). Defendants contended that their
copying of Oracle software was to analyze and extract information to perform
maintenance on their client's computer systems and was thus transformative. The court
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In Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corporation the
Ninth Circuit discussed transformativeness in connection with the
reverse engineering of a copyrighted computer program.330 Connectix, a
video game system manufacturer, wanted to create its Virtual Game
Station that would enable the compact discs used in Sony's PlayStation
console to be played on a regular home computer.331 To do this, it had to
repeatedly copy Sony's basic input-output system that operates the
PlayStation.33 2 The court, applying Sega, held that this was fair use, and
said that the defendant's Virtual Game Station was 'modestly
transformative.'
The product creates a new platform, the personal computer, on
which consumers can play games designed for the Sony
PlayStation. This innovation affords opportunities for game play
in new environments, specifically anywhere a Sony PlayStation
console and television are not available, but a computer with a
CD-ROM drive is. More important, the Virtual Game Station
itself is a wholly new product, notwithstanding the similarity of
uses and functions . . . Sony does not claim that the Virtual
Game Station itself contains object code that infringes Sony's
copyright. We are therefore at a loss to see how Connectix's
drafting of an entirely new object code for its VGS program
could not be transformative, despite the similarities in function
and screen output.3 33
However, there may be limits on how far some courts are willing to
push the transformative use standard to accommodate reverse
engineering and decompiling. In the Oracle v. Google litigation saga
over Google's use of Oracle's Java Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs) to implement its Android operating system, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit criticized the lower court for relying on the Sega
and Sony v. Connectix decisions in holding that the APIs were not
acknowledged that a secondary work could be transformative in function or purpose
without actually altering or adding to the original work. Id.
330. Sony Comput. Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
331. Id.
332. Id. at 598-99.
333. Id at 606-07; see also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, No. CV99-7654-HLH
(VBK), 2003 WL 21406289 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003) (Sega applied to permit automated
temporary copying of interior webpages to extract factual information contained on those
pages). But see Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (C.D. Cal.
2012) (Sega not applied to reproductions enabling AutoHop to automatically skip
advertisements and commercials).
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subject to copyright. However, after concluding that the APIs were
copyrightable, it left open the possibility that Google might have a fair
use defense. 3 It noted disputed issues of fact as to whether Google's
use was transformative and the impact of the use on the market for a
licensed Java-based phone, and it suggested that the desire for
interoperability might be relevant to the second and third fair use
factors.3" The case thus returned to the district court for a trial on
Google's fair use defense, with Google telling the jury that its use of the
Oracle's Java APIs for a mobile operating system was a new and original
purpose; hence, transformative.336 It also argued that the second and third
factors favored fair use, and that the market harm factor favored it as
well because no one was using the APIs for mobile devices. 337 The jury
found fair use and the decision is being appealed.
3. Thumbnails, Linking, and the Internet
There have been several suits attempting to prevent Internet search
engines like Amazon and Google from providing or utilizing images of
plaintiffs' protected works associated with relevant text in response to a
user's search query. 339 These images are thumbnails; reduced, low
resolution versions of full-sized images stored on third-party
computers. 3 40 The challenged thumbnails were, however, stored on the
search engine provider's servers.341 When a user clicked the thumbnail,
he or she was then linked to a third-party computer holding the full-size
version of the image. Entities that owned the copyright on the images
asserted that Amazon's and Google's utilization of these thumbnail
versions infringed their reproduction and public display rights.3 4 3 Courts
334. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2014), rev'g
872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012); ELECTRONIC FREEDOM FOUNDATION,
www.eff.org/cases/oracle-v-google (last visited Oct. 3, 2017); CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., supra
note 3, at 885.
335. Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1376-77.
3 3 6. Id
337. Jeff John Roberts, Google and Oracle's $9.3 Billion Fair Use Fight Starts Today,
Here's a Guide, FORTUNE (May 9, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/09/google-oracle-
fair-use/.
338. ELECTRONIC FREEDOM FOUNDATION, www.eff.org/cases/oracle-v-google (last
visited Oct. 3, 2017) (Oracle is appealing this decision).
339. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007);
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F. 3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416
F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
340. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1156.
341. Id at 1157.
342. Id
343. Id
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held that the thumbnails directly infringed these exclusive rights, 34 4 but
concluded that the use of the thumbnails in search engines was a fair use
in part because using protected images as thumbnails was said to be
transformative.3 45
For example, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft the Ninth Circuit stated that
although the defendant made 'exact replications' of the plaintiff s images
the thumbnails were much smaller, lower-resolution images that
served an entirely different function than Kelly's original
images. Kelly's images are artistic works intended to inform and
to engage the viewer in an aesthetic experience. His images are
used to portray scenes of the American West in an aesthetic
manner. Arriba's use of Kelly's images in the thumbnails is
unrelated to any aesthetic purpose. Arriba's search engine
functions as a tool to help index and improve access to images
on the internet and their related web sites.
This use was not simply a retransmission of the images in a different
medium and thus arguably a superseding use by the defendant. Instead,
347defendant's use of the images was for an entirely different purpose.
This was held to be highly transformative even though the images were
not substantially altered but for the reduction in size and lower
resolution.3 48  In this context, the transformative use standard
complemented the traditional four-factor fair use analysis.
344. Id at 1161-62; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 816-17. The search engine providers are not,
however, directly infringing when the user clicks the thumbnail to link to a full-sized
imaged stored on a third-party computer because those images, unlike the thumbnails, are
not stored on Google's or Amazon's servers. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1160-61.
345. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818-19; Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1164-65.
346. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.
347. Id.; See Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1165; Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp.
2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (holding search engine caching of websites is a fair use). But see
Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2003).
Video Pipeline's internet sites, which rented or sold videos and DVDs, provided short
clips of movies from its large database so that customers of those sites could preview the
movies. Disney challenged, but Video Pipeline asserted that its use of these video clips
from its database was transformative because the use was informational instead of for
entertainment. However, the practice was enjoined because of its impact on Disney's
market for similar clips.
348. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1165. Cf A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630,
639 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding reproduction of copyrighted term papers and essays in
connection with plagiarism detection software has an entirely different function and
purpose than the original works); Rosen v. eBay, Inc., No. CV 13-6801 MWF (Ex), 2015
WL 1600081 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015) (holding posting of magazine photos, as used to
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4. The Google Books Project and Transformative Use
Google's announcement in 2004 that it had reached agreements with
several major libraries to digitize their collections and make them
available for full-text searching on the Internet resulted in objections
from copyright owners and litigation. Works were reproduced in their
entirety to create this massive database. Works in the public domain (i.e.,
those published before 1923) were displayed to users in their entirety
while users looking at post-1923 works; presumed to be protected, would
see only basic bibliographic information and brief excerpts surrounding
the user's search terms. 34 9 Google was not authorized by copyright
owners to copy or display their works, and it did not compensate them
for these uses.3so Courts have now held that reproducing the copyrighted
books in digital format and making the 'snippets' available to users is a
fair use."'
In Authors Guild v. Hathitrust3 52 the plaintiffs challenged the
digitization by Google of over ten million books held in the collections
of eighty member institutions, including the University of Michigan and
the University of California, for contribution to the Hathitrust Digital
Library. This database enables the general public to search for particular
terms though all its materials. However, absent authorization, the search
results only shows page numbers where the search terms are found and
the number of times the term appears. This digital library also allows
patrons with certified print disabilities to have full text access to works.
Finally, it permits member libraries to replace their copies of works
which are lost, destroyed or stolen when a replacement copy is not
obtainable at a fair price elsewhere.
represent magazines available for resale, is a fair use because the images are used for the
fundamentally different purpose of promoting a secondary market).
349. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208-11 (2d Cir. 2015).
350. Neil Boorstyn, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 28 COPYRIGHT L.J. 4 (Jan.-Feb.
2014).
351. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd, 755
F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) aff'd, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). This litigation lasted well over a
decade. The Authors Guild and Google reached a settlement in 2008 but it was amended
after objections from third parties, and ultimately rejected by the district court in 2011 as
not being "fair, adequate, and reasonable." A class was certified in 2012 but then vacated
by the Second Circuit in 2013. On remand, both parties moved for summary judgment on
the issue of fair use. Bloomberg BNA P.T.C. Journal, 87 PTCJ 101 (Nov. 15, 2013).
352. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 445.
353. Id. at 448-49.
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The lower court found defendants' use to be fair and granted their
motion for summary judgment.354 The first factor heavily favored the
defendants. The purpose of the use was for scholarship and research so
the character of the use was said to be transformative.3 5 ' The court of
appeals affirmed, ruling that the creation of a full-text searchable
database is a "quintessentially" transformative use, explaining that the
result of a word search is different in purpose, character, expression,
meaning, and message from the page and the book from which it is
drawn by providing superior search capabilities and facilitating access.356
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. 357 is similar. The lower court
opinion lists the benefits of Google Books including being an important
reference tool; facilitating research; promoting data mining and text
mining; expanding access to works; providing print disabled persons
with the ability to read works by using text enlargement software, text to
speech software, and Braille devices; and, generating new audiences and
new sources of income for many copyright owners, book sellers, and
authors.3 58 It also found that Google's use of copyrighted works was
highly transformative because digitization transforms text into a
comprehensive word index that helps readers, scholars, researchers and
others find books. The use of text to facilitate search through display of
snippets was seen as being analogous to the transformative use of
thumbnails in the Kelly v. Arriba Soft and Perfect 10 cases. 3 59 The court
explained that the display of snippets for text search or research is a
different purpose than that of the copyright owners' in that the 'snippets
direct users to a broad selection of books, and opens up new fields of
research. Moreover, Google's use does not supplant books because it
cannot be used to read books. Accordingly, it provides for the creation of
new information, aesthetics, insights, and understandings.36 0
The Second Circuit affirmed in a comprehensive opinion by the
judge whose 1990 law review article gave birth to the transformative use
standard, the Honorable Pierre Leval. The court carefully analyzed the
354. Id. at 464.
355. Id. at460-61.
356. Hathitrust, 755 F.3d at 97. The court determined that providing access to the print
was not transformative because the underlying purpose of the digital version was the
same as the original author's purpose. Nevertheless, this use also was held to be fair. Id.
at 101-02. The court did not rule on the Hathitrust's preservation use of the plaintiffs'
works. Id. at 103-04.
357. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd,
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
358. Id. at 287-88.
359. Id. at 291; see also supra notes 339-48 and accompanying text
360. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (discussing how Judge Chin analyzed and
discussed all the fair use factors).
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purpose of the search and snippet functions and ultimately affirmed that
they were transformative and fair use.36' Judge Leval wrote that "[w]e
have no difficulty concluding that Google's making of a digital copy of
Plaintiffs' books for the purpose of enabling a search for identification of
books containing a term of interest to the searcher involves a highly
transformative purpose," in the sense intended by Campbell.362 He also
said that "[s]nippet view . . . adds importantly to the highly
transformative purpose of identifying books of interest to the searcher.
With respect to the first factor test, it favors a finding of fair use."363
Judge Leval, on behalf of a unanimous Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, ultimately deployed a traditional fair use analysis in concluding
that the scanning of millions of books in the Google Books project was
lawful.364 The transformative use standard played an important role in the
court's analysis because notwithstanding Google's profit motive, the
defendants' transformative purposes were numerous and clear.
Moreover, there was no evidence of substitutive competition.36 ' The
fundamental purposes of copyright were well served by holding that the
scanning of protected materials critical to making the search engine
function effectively is fair use.
361. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214-25 (2d Cir. 2015); But see
Code Revision Comm'n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (N.D. Ga.
2017) (stating that reproduction of the entire Georgia Code, including copyrightable
annotations and other copyrightable materials, on the Internet as a searchable free
database is neither transformative nor a fair use); Am. Soc'y for Testing & Materials v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 121 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1513 (D. D.C. 2017) (holding
reproduction and display of public domain and copyrightable materials-codes and
standards for testing, buildings, electrical systems, and the like developed by private
organizations and adopted by public entities-on free database is not transformative and
not fair use).
362. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216-17 (2d Cir. 2015).
363. Id. at 218. But see Fox News Network v. TVEyes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 325
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that the defendant's archiving function was fair use but that its
downloading and date-time search functions were not fair use, where defendant media-
monitoring service recorded content on more than 1,400 television and radio stations and
then transforms the content into a searchable database that enables subscribers to track
when, where and how words of interest are used in the media).
364. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), affd,
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015)..
365. Jeff John Roberts, Google Book is 'Highly Transformative,' Appeals Court
Confirms in Fair Use Ruling, FORTUNE (Oct. 16, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/10/16/google-books-appeals-court/.
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m. NOT TRANSFORMATIVE BUT STILL FAIR USE
There are a few post-Campbell v. Acuff-Rose decisions in which
courts have stated that a challenged use of a copyrighted work was not
transformative but still found fair use. After all, the Supreme Court stated
in Campbell that concluding that a use is transformative is not required
for finding fair use.366
In Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Camp SystemS 367 defendant Camp
Systems reproduced extensive portions of Gulfstream's maintenance
manuals which Camp borrowed from owners of Gulfstream aircraft.
Camp used the reproduced manuals to provide routine scheduled
maintenance services on these owners' planes. In discussing Camp's fair
use defense, the court said this copying was not transformative since the
reproduced portions of the manuals were being used the very way they
were intended to be used. 36 8 However, the fourth fair use factor-impact
on the market-weighed heavily in Camp's favor. Gulfstream's
copyright claim had nothing to do with incentives to create the
maintenance manuals. "Rather, what Gulfstream seeks here is to use its
claimed copyright in its manuals to gain a judicially-enforced monopoly
in maintenance-tracking services for Gulfstream aircraft." 369
Similarly, in S&L Vitamins v. Australian Gold 370 a company's use of
thumbnail images of its competitor's tanning products on its own website
in marketing its own tanning products was not transformative, but the
court concluded that it had no impact on the market for or value of the
competitor's copyrighted work. Instead, this legitimate comparative
advertising could have an impact on the sale of the parties' tanning
products. 37 1 The lesson of these two decisions is that a nontransformative
use can be a fair use against a plaintiff who is seeking to use its copyright
not to protect a creative work but to prevent fair competition.
366. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
367. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Camp Sys. Int'l, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (S.D. Ga.
2006).
368. Id. at 1377.
369. Id. at 1380.
370. S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188 (E.D.N.Y
2007).
371. Id. at 214-15; see also Super Future Equities, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn.,
N.A., 553 F. Supp. 2d 680 (N.D. Tex. 2008). Super Future Equities posted the claimant's
copyrighted image on an informational website in which it was critical of the claimant's
business practices. The court found there was nothing transformative about the posted
image since the criticism was not aimed at the protected work, but it concluded that this
posting had no impact on the value of the copyrighted image and was deemed a fair use.
Id.
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There has been other decisions in which courts found that a
particular use of protected material was not transformative but still found
that fair use fit comfortably within one of the uses listed in section 107's
preamble, like cases involving news reporting. Los Angeles News Service
v. CBS Broadcasting3 72 concerned the showing of excerpts of the
plaintiffs nine-minute clip of the beating of Reginald Denny in
connection with Court TV's coverage of the trial of the man who had
assaulted Mr. Denny. In earlier rulings the Ninth Circuit had said merely
rebroadcasting videos of the Los Angeles riots without a license was
neither transformative nor a fair use.3 73 In this case Court TV plucked the
most interesting nine minutes of coverage and did not add anything
new,3 74 yet the trial and appellate courts said that Court TV's use of the
clip was fair.375 More recently, the Second Circuit repeated a statement
from Campbell that a transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a
fair use finding376 and then added that "[i]n the context of news reporting
and analogous activities . . . the need to convey information to the public
accurately may in some instances make it desirable and consonant with
copyright law for a defendant to faithfully reproduce an original work
rather than transform it." 37 7
There are other post-Campbell decisions which do not discuss
whether the defendant's use is transformative but still conclude that the
first factor favors the defendant. For example, in Jackson v. Warner
Brothers the plaintiffs paintings could be seen in the movie, "Made in
America," for less than sixty seconds and the court said that the first
factor favored defendant in finding fair use.378 Without discussing
transformativeness, the court pointed out that the plaintiffs works were
not the focus of the movie, could not be seen clearly, and were not
superseded by the defendant's use of them.379 In Bond v. Blum an
372. L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002).
373. L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997); L.A.
News Serv. v. Reuters TV Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.2d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998).
374. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d at 939. The court added that the inclusion of the clip
in a video montage to introduce the Prime-Time Justice program had a better claim of
transformativeness. Id.
375. Id. at 938-40 (9th Cir. 2002) Finding that it was not transformative "for the most
part." Id.
376. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. v. Bloomberg L.P., 742 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2014) (citing
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579) amended and superseded by 756
F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014). Bloomberg published verbatim the transcript of plaintiff's
conference call discussion of the company's 2010 earnings report.
377. Id. at 28-29.
378. Jackson v. Warner Bros., 993 F. Supp. 585, 589-90 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
379. Id. at 589. The court also said that the defendant's use of the paintings was de
minimis and could not be regarded as a substitute for the works. Id. at 590-91. See
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author's autobiographical manuscript about the murder of his own father
was introduced as evidence in a child custody dispute by his wife's ex-
husband to show that this author's household would not be suitable for
children.3 8 0 The author alleged copyright infringement but the court
concluded that the first factor weighed in favor of fair use because the
narrow purpose of the defendant ex-husband's use of the manuscript was
as evidence; it contained admissions against the plaintiff author's
*381interests.
The relatively few post-Campbell decisions in which the courts
conclude that a use was not transformative or do not even discuss the
doctrine can be explained by several factors: the challenged use was not
a substitute for the protected work; the challenged use had no impact on
the market for or value of the copyrighted work; the amount taken-
qualitatively or quantitatively-was insubstantial; or, the defendant's use
of plaintiffs work served copyright's fundamental purposes. This latter
point is well illustrated by the fair use determinations in the litigation
saga over digital reserve room practices in the Georgia State University
libraries.382
Before analyzing each of forty-eight alleged instances of
infringement, forty-four of which were held to be fair use, the lower
court made the following statement:
In the fair use analyses for the various claims which follow,
factor one ("the purpose and character of the use") will
uniformly favor fair use because all uses were strictly of a
nonprofit educational character for the sole purpose of teaching
Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 409-10 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding defendant's commercial use of four illustrations and seven phrases from
plaintiff's over 100-page book with over eighty photographs weighed against fair use but
given all the evidence at trial the jury's finding of fair use was well supported-there was
no discussion of transformativeness and whether the defendant's use was de minimis);
see also Mastercard Int'l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00civ.6068
(GBD), 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) (holding candidate's television ad,
which played off MasterCard's successful Priceless ads, to be a parody and fair use but
transformativeness was not discussed).
380. Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 2003).
381. Id. at 395; see also Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer &
Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding defendant law firm's use of a
search tool on a public website to access archived screen shots in connection with a
trademark infringement suit to be a fair use with the court, without discussing
transformativeness, saying that factor one favored the defendant firm).
382. See generally Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga.
2012), rev'd, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014), on
remand, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE, 2016 WL 3098397
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2016).
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students in classes at a nonprofit educational institution,
notwithstanding the nontransformative nature of the use. This
outcome will be stated summarily in each fair use analysis to
avoid repetition.
In its initial 2012 ruling the trial court said that the language of
section 107 and the Campbell decision compelled a finding that factor
one favored fair use.384 It stated that
[t]his case involves making copies of excerpts of copyrighted
works for teaching students and for scholarship, as specified in
the preamble of § 107. The use is for strictly nonprofit
educational purposes as specified in § 107(1). The fact that the
copying is done by a nonprofit educational institution leaves no
doubt on this point.
In response the publisher's contention that factor one favored the
plaintiffs because the uses were not transformative, the court quoted a
footnote from Campbell saying that "[t]he obvious statutory exception to
this focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple
copies for classroom distribution." 38 6 In essence, there was no need for
the court to stretch the transformative use standard out of shape to.
accommodate this kind of unauthorized reproduction of protected works
for learning and educational purposes.
IV. TAKINGS THAT ARE NOT TRANSFORMATIVE AND NOT FAIR USE
The presumption-like status of the transformative use concept cuts
both ways. In the majority of reported decisions in which the court
383. Becker, 2016 WL 3098397 at *9.
384. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1224 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
385. Id. at 1224.
386. Id. at 1224-25 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994)); see also Reiner v. Nishimori, No. 3:15-cv-00241, 2017 WL 1545589 (M.D. Tn.
Apr. 28, 2017) (holding summary judgment dismissing plaintiff photographer's claims
against an art school and a student who used plaintiff's photo for educational purposes as
a mock ad in connection with a class assignment).
387. The post-Campbell emphasis on transformative uses seems to ignore the Betamax
decision and the Court's recognition that verbatim copying of a work for personal use is
fair. Twisting and pushing a particular use to say it is transformative is one thing, but
courts must not ignore or forget that there is often social value to copying a work
verbatim for personal use. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay: How
Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535
(2004).
2018] 331
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
determined that the defendant's use of plaintiffs work was
transformative, it found fair use. Conversely, in the overwhelming
majority of the reported decisions in which a court concluded that the
defendant's use was not transformative, it ruled against fair use and
found infringement. These decisions ordinarily involve taking too much
without a different purpose; the appropriations of protected expression
that are substantial, the original work is altered only slightly if not at all,
and the defendant appropriator's intent or purpose in using the secondary
work is very similar to that of the protected work. Most substantial
takings with little, if any, transformation, are hard to justify as fair use.
For example, a movie intended to be a prequel to the original Star
Trek series with use or reference to elements and details in the original
series, done to stay true to the canon, was held not transformative and not
fair use. The court said that the defendants wanted their Axanar works to
supplant the Star Trek works. 88 Similarly, the author of a book about the
rise and fall of Pan American Airlines who admittedly used at least
twenty-five percent of the words and phrases from a published book
about one of Pan American Airlines' founders in his unpublished
manuscript sought a declaratory judgment that he did not infringe. 3 89 He
lost on summary judgment, with the court finding infringement to an
extraordinary degree,o and saying it was clear that no reasonable jury
could find fair use. 391 It also said that no jury could find that this use of
material was transformative to a substantial degree. The declaratory
judgment plaintiff took a substantial portion of the protected work
verbatim, added a couple of chapters, and worked in some transitions. 392
"In essence, Robinson did nothing more than update a shortened version
of Daley's book and pass it off as his own. When the secondary use
involves such an untransformed duplication of the original, it has little or
no value that does not exist in the original work." 39 3
388. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Axanar Prods., No. 2:15-CV-09938-RGK-E, 2017
WL 83506 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2017).
389. Robinson v. Random House, Inc. 877 F. Supp. 830, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
390. Id.
391. Id. at 843.
392. Id. at 834.
393. Id. at 840-41; see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs.,
923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (defendant's posting of a substantial amount of
plaintiff's writings with very little in the way of criticism or commentary was not fair use
in part because the posting was only minimally transformative because so little was
added to the plaintiffs works); Richards v. Merriam Webster, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 3d 205
(D. Mass. 2014) (defendant's copying and modification of roughly seventy percent of
plaintiffs dictionary as a public service to facilitate reading comprehensive might be
transformative but the other three factors strongly disfavored fair use so infringement was
found); Penguin Random House LLC v. Colting, No. 17-CV-386 (JSR), 2017 WL
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The manufacturer of a karaoke device asserted in a declaratory
judgment action that its reproduction and display of song lyrics on the
video screen was a fair use.394 It asserted that karaoke teaches singing by
allowing people to sing along with recorded music, but the court said it
was not reasonable to infer that teaching was the purpose of the
manufacturer's use of the lyrics. It was, however, reasonable to infer that
the manufacturer did not alter or add to the lyrics. The court
acknowledged that posting the lyrics facilitated parent control over
objectionable songs, but said that the ultimate purpose of the use was
commercial and not fair.39 5
In another case a cleric posted substantial portions of a Greek
Orthodox monastery's copyrighted English language translations of
ancient Greek religious texts without permission. The court ruled
against fair use, saying that the cleric's postings were not transformative
because they were essentially verbatim copies with miniscule alterations
that served the same underlying purpose as the original translations; to
further religious practices and education. 397
Similarly, a bank copied and used copyrighted reverse mortgage
forms which had been created by a mortgage counseling service after the
3977000 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2017) (holding on summary judgment that unauthorized
children's guides to Breakfast at Tiffany's, The Old Man and the Sea, On the Road, and
other novels were not transformative, but infringing derivative works).
394. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Publ'g, 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008).
395. Id. at 530.
396. Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir.
2012).
397. Id. at 60; see also Worldwide Church of God v. Phil. Church of God, Inc., 227
F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding defendant religious organization's copying of
plaintiffs book in its entirety supersedes the object of the original book-to serve
religious practice and education-and is not transformative nor a fair use); Peter
Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1309-12 (11th
Cir. 2008) (holding an organization's unauthorized use of plaintiff's course materials to
teach sales techniques to members as part of their training was not transformative, but
after evaluating all the factors it found fair use as to one set of materials but not as to
another set). Cf C. Entrance Examination Bd. v. Pataki, 889 F. Supp. 554, 567-68
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding the xerographic reproduction and disclosure of copyrighted
test materials pursuant to state law would not be transformative use of those materials so
the state failed to establish that disclosure of the materials would be a fair use); Veeck v.
S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, 293 F.3d 791, 823-24 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Wiener, J.,
dissenting). Opinion with disagreement about several issues and a dissenting opinion
stating that website operator's posting of copyrighted but enacted model building codes
was not a fairuse since nothing about the posting was transformative and the posting
could have a negative impact on the market for the copyrighted model codes. Id.
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bank had terminated its participation in the service's program.9 The
bank raised a fair use defense that was rejected. The court said that the
factor one inquiry was whether the new work is transformative rather
than a mere successor to the original, and then explained that the bank's
form was a copy of the plaintiff s form that served the same purpose and
thus supplanted it.3 9 9
The reproduction of plaintiffs aerial photographs of a construction
site for presentation to arbitrators and witnesses in a dispute over that site
was held to infringe the photographer's copyright in Images Audio Visual
Productions, Inc. v. Perini Building Co., Inc. 400 The defendant's fair use
defense failed in part because there was nothing transformative about the
defendant's reproduction of the pictures and they were used for the same
purpose they were intended to serve; to provide a record of defendant's
progress on the contested construction site.401 In Dahlen v. Michigan
Licensed Beverage Association4 02 the defendants negotiated with plaintiff
about making a poster that would inform bar patrons about their rights
regarding drinking and driving, and then, after negotiations broke down,
they went ahead and used plaintiffs 'We Care About You' poster to
create their own poster titled 'Do You Know Your Rights?' 40 3 The two
posters were not identical but there was considerable overlap including
similar layouts and content.404 In holding that the defendant's use of the
plaintiff's poster was not fair use the court discussed transformative use
and said that the first factor heavily favored the plaintiff because the
defendant's poster did not imbue the work with a "further purpose or
405different character," or add anything new to the poster's mission.
"[T]he two works are intended for precisely the same audience, and
provide their intended readers with almost entirely the same
information." 406
398. Homeowner Options for Mass. Elders, Inc. v. Brookline Bancorp, Inc., 754 F.
Supp. 2d 201, 204-05 (D. Mass. 2010). The forms the defendant used contained the
H.O.M.E. acronym. Id. at 205.
399. Id. at 209-10.
400. Images Audio Visual Prods. v. Perini Bldg. Co., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (E.D. Mich.
2000).
401. Id at 1081.
402. Dahlen v. Mich. Licensed Bev. Ass'n, 132 F. Supp. 2d 574 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
403. Id at 576-77. Plaintiff's poster also advised bar patrons of facts relating to
drinking and driving, including what to do in the event you stopped by police for
suspicion of driving under the influence. Id.
404. Id. at 577.
405. Id at 586.
406. Id. There were, however, fact issues that precluded the grant of summary
judgment for either side. See also Davis v. GAP, Inc., 244 F.3d 152, 174 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding a defendant's use in an advertisement of a photograph in which one of the
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Transformative use arguments also fail when the secondary user
breaches a license and continues to use the plaintiffs copyrighted work.
For example, Twentieth Century Fox Films, in connection with a breach
of contract suit, asserted that Marvel Enterprises' use of clips from its X-
Men films and trailers in promoting its new Mutant X television series
was copyright infringement as well as a breach of the licensing
agreement, Marvel raised fair use, and the court concluded fair use was
inapplicable.40 7 It said that Marvel's use of the films and trailers was like
Fox's use of them; promotional. They had not created a transformative
408
work altering the original with a new expression, meaning or message.
Similarly, a computer software developer sued the Los Angeles County
Sheriffs Department for copyright infringement after the department
loaded the plaintiffs software on over 6,000 computers when the
department had purchased licenses for 3,663 computers.40 The
department claimed fair use but the court concluded otherwise, saying
that there was nothing transformative about the department's use since it
made exact copies of the software and put them to use for the same
purpose as the original software.410
V. CONCLUSION
Most reported decisions discussing and applying the transformative
use standard, like fair use decisions generally, fit within recurring
patterns or clusters, as shown by the dozen categories and subcategories
analyzed in this article. In some of these categories, such as parody, uses
out of context and appropriation art, the court's analysis and discussion
of whether an unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted work is
transformative performs an important role in explaining why that
particular use is or is not fair. However, in the fair use categories listed in
models wore the plaintiff's copyrighted eye jewelry was not transformative and fair use
because it showed the jewelry as it was made to be worn, like an ad the plaintiff might
have sponsored for his design).
407. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1, 45-46
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
408. Id. at 46-47; see also Lamb v. Starks, 949 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756-57 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (alleged infringer claimed fair use in posting a movie trailer without permission but
was unable to rebut that this was infringement since the use was clearly commercial).
409. Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 773-74 (9th Cir.
2006).
410. Id. at 778; SCQuARE Int'l., Ltd. v. BBDO Atl., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 1347 (N.D.
Ga. 2006) (holding defendant's creation and use of a condensed version of plaintiffs
training program was not remotely transformative since the defendant's version did not
comment on or build upon plaintiffs manuals, and as an abridgement the manuals
presented the possibility of supplanting the plaintiff's works).
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section 107's preamble, which were well-established before Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose was decided in 1994, such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, and copying for educational and research purposes, it is
unnecessary for courts to turn to the transformative use standard. When it
is relatively clear that the challenged use fits within one of those well-
established categories, it would be better for the courts to stick with a
straight-forward analysis using section 107's four factors. This is
preferable to trying to twist and turn the transformative use standard to
accommodate and explain a challenged use. Otherwise, the
transformative use standard becomes more presumption-like, implicitly
amending section 107. This outcome is counter to the Supreme Court's
explicit rejection in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 4 1 1 of using presumptions in
fair use analysis. Moreover, in view of the subtle distinction between
some allegedly transformative uses and derivative works, 4 12 the
standard's evolution into a presumption risks undermining the right to
prepare derivative works.4 1 The standard should not be allowed to
eviscerate this important right. Like the old productive or nonproductive
use distinction discussed by the Supreme Court in the venerable
Sony/Betamax decision,414 analyzing whether a particular use is
transformative should be helpful but not the determinative consideration
in assessing fair use.
411. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584-91 (1994).
412. Supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text
413. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (West 2012).
414. Supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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